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ABSTRACT	  
Despite	  widespread	   calls	   for	   political	   change	   stemming	   from	  public	   dissatisfaction	   over	   a	  plethora	   of	   evidence	   of	   backdoor	   dealings	   and	   how	   politics	   has	   been	   run,	   intent	   to	  thoroughly	   reform	   the	   political	   system	   is	   not	   evident	   among	   parties.	   In	   this	   paper,	   I	  investigate	  why	  this	  is	  so	  among	  local	  parties.	  I	  argue	  that	  one	  largely	  overlooked	  reason	  is	  the	   restrictions	   on	   local	   governments	   in	   the	   form	  of	   central-­‐local	   relations.	   Because	   local	  governments	   depend	   on	   the	   center	   for	   funds	   and	   administrative	   support	   to	   implement	  many	   policies	   and	   carry	   out	   public	   works	   projects,	   they	   cannot	   afford	   to	   endanger	   their	  relations	   with	   the	   central	   government	   and	   are	   thus	   cautious	   when	   responding	   to	   public	  demands	  for	  administrative	  reform.	  They	  are	  also	  circumscribed	  by	  what	  local	  governments	  can	  carry	  out	  given	  their	  limited	  administrative	  and	  financial	  powers.	  In	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   paper,	   I	   look	   at	   the	   intent	   of	   parties	   to	   affect	   change	   by	  examining	   local	   party	  manifestos	   from	   the	   LDP	   and	   the	   DPJ	   across	   23	   prefectures.	   Local	  party	  manifestos	  began	  to	  be	  used	  in	  2003	  and	  has	  been	  increasingly	  in	  elections	  ever	  since.	  My	  inquiry	  is	  made	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  local	  party	  manifesto	  content.	  Policy	  proposals	  are	   categorized	   into	   various	   groups,	   and	   the	   compositions	   of	   manifestos	   are	   compared	  across	  parties.	  I	  establish	  that	  local	  parties	  look	  beyond	  voters’	  preferences	  and	  their	  own	  ideological	   positions	  when	   proposing	   policies.	   Specifically,	   central-­‐local	   relations	   are	   also	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  In	   the	  second	  part,	   I	   investigate	  how	  the	  contents	  of	  LDP	   local	  party	  manifestos	  vary	  with	  the	  strength	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations.	  First,	  I	  compare	  the	  parties	  of	  local	  politicians	  in	  prefectural	   assemblies	   with	   the	   parties	   of	   national	   politicians	   in	   their	   respective	   Lower	  House	  election	  districts	   to	  determine	   the	  degree	  of	  matching	  between	  parties	  of	   local	  and	  
	  	  	  
national	  politicians.	  Next,	  I	  draw	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  local	  party	  manifestos	  in	  the	  previous	  section	   and	   examine	   it	   in	   view	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   congruity	   between	   parties	   of	   local	   and	  national	  politicians.	  	  Results	   indicate	   that	  prefectures	  with	   closer	   central-­‐local	   relations	   (as	   approximated	  by	   the	   degree	   of	   matching	   between	   parties	   of	   local	   prefectural	   assembly	   politicians	   and	  Lower	  House	  politicians)	  have	  a	  lower	  proportion	  of	  policies	  that	  deal	  with	  administrative	  and	   political	   reform.	   This	   confirms	  my	   hypothesis	   that	   local	   governments	   in	   prefectures	  with	  stronger	  central-­‐local	  ties	  are	  more	  restrained	  than	  local	  governments	   in	  prefectures	  with	  weaker	  ties,	  and	  therefore	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  propose	  policies	  advocating	  administrative	  reform.	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1. INTRODUCTION	  	  
Political	  apathy	  and	  disenchantment	  with	  the	  political	  system	  in	  Japan	  has	  been	  rising	  over	  the	  years,	  from	  when	  blatant	  political	  corruption	  amongst	  bureaucrats	  and	  politicians	  in	  the	  1980s	  shocked	  the	  nation	  and	  destroyed	  the	  high	  esteem	  in	  which	  bureaucrats	  were	  held.	  Severe	  pollution	  in	  the	  1970s,	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  government	  to	  face	  them	  head-­‐on	   in	   the	   face	  of	   resistance	   from	  politically-­‐important	  big	  businesses	  and	   industries;	  ineffectual	  policies	   to	  pull	   Japan	  out	  of	   its	   two	  decade-­‐long	   recession	  and	  boost	  economic	  growth;	   and	   increasing	   dislocations	   within	   the	   economy	   brought	   about	   by	   high	   speed	  growth	  and	  subsequently	  by	  slowing	  growth	  have	  resulted	  in	  an	  increasingly	  loud	  chorus	  of	  voices	   calling	   for	   changes	   within	   the	   government.	   The	   landslide	   victory	   of	   the	   Liberal	  Democratic	   Party	   (LDP)	   in	   the	   recent	   elections	   in	   December	   2012	   and	   ousting	   of	   the	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Japan	  (DPJ)	  from	  the	  government	  was	  seen	  not	  as	  a	  mandate	  from	  the	  people	  to	  rule,	  but	  rather,	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  Abe	  himself	  put	  it,	  ‘a	  rejection	  of	  the	  last	  three	  years	  of	  political	  confusion’	  (Nakamoto,	  Dickie	  and	  Soble	  2012).	  Yet	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  intense	  voter	  dissatisfaction	  and	  calls	  for	  reform,	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  little	  change	  has	  actually	  been	  effected.	  Parties	  still	  rely	  heavily	  on	  pork-­‐barrel	  spending	  to	  entice	  voters	  and	  policies	  still	  skirt	  around	  key	  issues	  such	  as	  welfare	  reform	  for	  women	  and	  part-­‐time	  workers	  rather	  than	  tackle	  them	  head	  on	  (Miura	  2012).	  The	  absence	  of	  change	  could	  be	  due	  to	  either	  the	  changes	  not	  being	  proposed	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  a	  failure	  to	  implement	  the	  changes,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  factors.	  	  In	   this	   paper,	   I	   look	   at	   the	   intent	   to	   change	   among	   local	   governments.	   Local	  governments	   are	   closer	   to	   the	   ground	   than	   the	   central	   government,	   and	   are	   therefore	   in	  better	  positions	  to	  identify	  and	  address	  the	  demands	  by	  the	  public	  (Hill	  and	  Fujita	  2000).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   local	  governments	  are	  also	  gaining	  power	  and	  accumulating	  resources	  that	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enable	  them	  to	  play	  larger	  roles	  in	  national	  policymaking	  (Muramatsu	  1988).	  To	  investigate	  the	  intent	  of	  parties	  in	  local	  governments,	  I	  turn	  to	  party	  manifestos.	  	  Party	   manifestos	   are	   tools	   by	   which	   parties	   ‘outlin[e]	   practical	   foundations	   for	  government	  policy	  or	  [use]	  as	  opportunities	  for	  criticizing	  opponents’,	  and	  are	  ‘statements	  of	   intent’,	   indicative	  of	  actual	  policy	  plans	  of	  parties	   (Bara	  2005).	  Manifestos,	   in	  principle,	  provide	  the	  menu	  of	  policy	  options	  from	  which	  voters	  vote	  for	  the	  party	  most	  in	  line	  with	  their	  ideals	  and	  preferences.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  voters’	  demands	  reflected	  in	  election	  results	  and	   channels	   of	   communication	   between	   governmental	   bodies	   and	   the	   public,	   such	   as	  through	   the	   lobbying	   of	   local	   assemblies	   or	   legislatures,	   mean	   that	   party	   manifestos	   are	  influenced	  by	  voter	  preferences	  as	  well.	  Empirical	  evidence	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  external	  voter-­‐related	   factors	   such	   as	   poor	   electoral	   performances	   are	   important	   for	   effecting	  change	  in	  party	  organizational	  structure	  and	  policy	  positions	  (Harmel	  et	  al.	  1995),	  in	  which	  one	  of	  the	  channels	  of	  reflection	  is	  in	  party	  manifestos	  (Janda	  et	  al.	  1995).	  	  While	  parties	  and	  voters	   influence	  each	  other,	   I	  believe	  that	  the	  pattern	  of	   local	  party	  manifestos	   also	   reflect	   a	   third,	   external	   factor	   –	   the	   institutional	   relationship	   between	  governmental	   bodies,	   or	   specifically,	   between	   local	   governments	   and	   the	   center.	   Local	  governments	   are	   different	   from	   national	   governments	   due	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   central	  government	   and	   overarching	   national	   policies	   that	   act	   as	   additional	   constraints	   on	   the	  options	   and	  maneuvering	   space	   available	   to	   local	   governments.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   local	  governments	   are	   more	   shielded	   from	   pressures	   from	   international	   organizations	   and	  governments	  than	  are	  national	  governments	  (Kim	  2011;	  Pak	  2000).	  Because	  parties	  in	  local	  governments	   are	   cognizant	   of	   the	   restraints	   in	   place	   that	   demarcate	   the	   political	   and	  administrative	   powers	   of	   local	   governments	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   center,	   policy	   options	   in	  manifestos	   are	   restricted	   to	   those	   that	   are	   politically,	   administratively,	   fiscally	   and	  ideologically	   feasible,	   or	   at	   the	   very	   least	   not	   wildly	   impossible	   or	   unrealistic	   given	   the	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prevailing	  relations	  and	  plausible	  future	  trends.	  Given	  that	  parties	  are	  held	  accountable	  to	  their	  election	  promises	  and	  are	  kept	  in	  place	  through	  the	  electoral	  process,	  I	  argue	  that	  local	  party	  manifestos	  may	   reflect	  more	   of	   the	   restraints	   faced	   by	   local	   governments	   than	   the	  ideological	   positions	   of	   local	   political	   parties.	   In	   particular,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   pattern	   of	  policies	  in	  local	  party	  manifestos	  points	  to	  the	  interdependent	  relationship	  model	  as	  a	  more	  accurate	   description	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   center	   and	   local	   government,	   as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  commonly-­‐cited	  vertical-­‐administrative	  model.	  	  	  This	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   I	   first	   describe	   the	   increasing	   importance	   of	   party	  manifestos	   in	   elections,	   and	   argue	   that	   central-­‐local	   relations	   should	   be	   taken	   into	  consideration	  when	   examining	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   differences	   in	   policy	   proposals	  across	  party	  manifestos.	  Next,	  I	  outline	  four	  models	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations,	  and	  examine	  patterns	   of	   policies	   in	   manifestos	   in	   the	   context	   of	   central-­‐local	   relations.	   In	   the	   fourth	  section,	   I	  describe	   the	  methodology	   for	  my	  analysis	  of	   local	  party	  manifestos,	   and	  explain	  the	  results	  of	  my	  analysis	   in	  the	  fifth	  section.	  Finally,	   I	   look	  at	  the	  results	  of	  the	  manifesto	  analysis	   in	   light	   of	   a	   separate	   test	   where	   I	   match	   the	   parties	   of	   local	   politicians	   in	  prefectural	   assemblies	   to	   the	  parties	  of	  politicians	   in	   the	  Lower	  House	   in	   their	   respective	  electoral	  districts.	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2. THE	  RISE	  OF	  MANIFESTOS	  
2.1	  THE	  1994	  ELECTORAL	  REFORM	  	  
The	  reform	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  from	  the	  Single	  Non-­‐Transferable	  Vote	  (SNTV)	  system	  in	  a	  Multi-­‐Member	  Districts	   (MMD)	   to	   one	  with	   a	   Single-­‐Member	  District	   (SMD)	   component	  and	   a	   Proportional	   Representation	   (PR)	   component	   was	   effected	   at	   the	   national	   level	   in	  1994.	   The	   electoral	   reform	   was	   implemented	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   moving	   away	   from	  personalistic	  politics	   to	   focus	  on	  party	   image	  and	  policy	   issues.	  Under	  this	  vision,	  a	  party-­‐based	   electoral	   strategy	   of	   appealing	   to	   voters	   would	   replace	   vote	   mobilization	   through	  personal	   networks	   and	   traditional	   channels.	   With	   the	   predicted	   increase	   in	   attention	   to	  party	  platforms,	  there	  was	  an	  expected	  rise	  in	  importance	  party	  manifestoes,	  through	  which	  parties	   communicate	   their	   vision	   and	   plans.	   The	   use	   of	   party	  manifestos	   started	   in	   2003	  with	  the	  need	  to	  enhance	  the	  party	  label	  as	  intra-­‐party	  competition	  amongst	  candidates	  was	  eliminated	  (McElwain	  and	  Reed	  2009;	  Kamata	  2004).	  Manifestos	  were	  also	  meant	  to	  appeal	  to	  non-­‐partisan	  voters,	  who	  have	  been	  increasing	  as	  the	  proportion	  of	  swing	  voters	   in	  the	  population	  has	  increased	  (Curtis	  2004).	  The	   1994	   reform	   transformed	   electoral	   politics	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   but	   did	   not	  directly	   change	   electoral	   rules	   at	   the	   local	   level	   where	   politicians	   at	   the	   prefectural	   and	  municipal	   levels	  are	  still	  directly	  elected	   in	  multi-­‐member	  districts.	  Yet	   local-­‐level	  politics	  were	   also	   transformed	  with	   the	   electoral	   reform.	  As	  parties	   started	   issuing	  manifestos	   to	  draw	  voters	  in	  competition	  with	  one	  another	  in	  national-­‐level	  politics,	  political	  parties	  also	  started	   issuing	   party	  manifestos	   as	   a	  means	   of	   competition	   in	   local	   elections.	   The	   rise	   in	  importance	  of	  manifestos	  in	  local	  elections	  began	  in	  2003,	  when	  11	  candidates	  –	  primarily	  from	  Iwate,	  Kanagawa	  and	  Fukuoka	  –	  unveiled	  local	  manifestos	  when	  standing	  for	  elections	  (Kamata	  2004).	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Rosenbluth	  and	  Thies	  (2010)	  believed	  that	  the	  combined	  effects	  of	  the	  1994	  electoral	  reform	  and	  reforms	  thereafter	  were	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  greater	  decentralization.	  A	  series	  of	  measures	   that	   increased	   autonomy	   and	   power	   of	   local	   governments	  were	   put	   in	   place	  following	  the	  1994	  electoral	  reform:	  the	  Decentralization	  Promotion	  Law	  was	  implemented	  in	  1995;	  the	  Comprehensive	  Laws	  on	  Decentralization	  in	  2000;	  the	  Trinity	  fiscal	  reforms	  in	  2005;	  and	  the	  New	  Decentralization	  Promotion	  Law	  in	  2007.	  While	  fiscal	  constraints	  faced	  by	   the	   central	   government	   and	   considerations	   for	   greater	   efficiency	   by	   delegating	  administrative	   functions	   to	   the	   local	   governments	   were	   real,	   Rosenbluth	   and	   Thies	  contended	   that	   these	   pressures	   had	   existed	   for	   a	   long	   time	   and	   were	   insufficient	   in	  explaining	   the	   sudden	   impetus	   for	   decentralization.	   The	   timing	   of	   the	   move	   of	   granting	  greater	   fiscal	   and	  administrative	  autonomy	   to	   local	   governments	   suggested	   that	   the	  1994	  electoral	   reform	   and	   its	   effects	   were	   the	   main	   impetuses	   that	   prompted	   the	   wave	   of	  decentralization.	  	  
2.2	  THE	  KOIZUMI	  REFORMS	  
The	  most	  important	  way	  the	  LDP	  kept	  a	  stronghold	  on	  its	  dominance	  over	  Japan’s	  political	  arena	  since	  1955	  was	  by	  channeling	  resources	  and	  large	  amounts	  of	  pork-­‐barrel	  spending	  into	  politically	  important	  constituents,	  and	  maintaining	  close	  relations	  with	  large	  organized	  groups	  and	  their	  individual	  kōenkai.	   	  However,	  the	  first	  appearance	  of	  the	  DPJ	  in	  1996,	  the	  rise	   in	   its	   support	   in	   both	   urban	   and	   rural	   areas,	   as	   well	   as	   evolving	   expectations	   and	  demands	  of	  the	  electorate	  changed	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game.	  Maintaining	  previous	  clientelistic	  bonds	  proved	  to	  be	  increasingly	  expensive,	  while	  calls	  for	  cleaner	  politics	  eventually	  forced	  politicians	  to	  respond	  and	  change	  their	  ways.	  Koizumi,	  the	  LDP	  Prime	  Minister	  at	  that	  time,	  and	   his	   supporters,	   decided	   that	   the	   past	   electoral	   strategy	   of	   depending	   on	   individual	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kōenkai,	  clientelistic	  spending	  and	  personal	  vote-­‐seeking	  was	  not	  sustainable	  and	  had	  to	  be	  phased	  out.	  Hence,	  Koizumi	  drastically	   cut	  back	   infrastructural	   spending	  and	   subsidies	   to	  the	  agricultural	  community,	  liberalized	  markets	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  more	  open	  and	  cleaner	  ties	  between	  politics	  and	  businesses,	  an	  reduced	  transfers	  to	  local	  governments	  (Kabashima	  and	  Steel	  2007).	  	  These	  measures	  weakened	  the	  ties	  the	  LDP	  had	  forged	  with	  its	  supporters,	  particularly	  those	  who	   relied	  heavily	  on	   the	  particularistic	   spending	  by	   the	  LDP,	   and	   correspondingly	  increased	   the	   number	   of	   unorganized	   swing	   voters	   not	   affiliated	  with	   any	   one	   particular	  party.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   DPJ	   took	   this	   opportunity	   to	  make	   advances	   to	   capture	   the	  votes	   of	   urban	   voters	   who	   had	  moved	   away	   from	   supporting	   the	   LDP,	   resulting	   in	   large	  increases	   in	   support	   for	   the	   DPJ	   even	   in	   rural	   areas,	   which	   had	   traditionally	   been	   the	  stronghold	  of	  the	  LDP.	  Together,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  DPJ	  was	  now	  a	  viable	  challenger	  to	  the	  LDP	   in	   ‘every	   type	  of	   electoral	  district’	   since	   the	  2005	  election	   (Reed,	   Scheiner	   and	  Thies	  2012).	  In	  particular,	  the	  reduction	  of	  subsidies	  to	  local	  governments	  greatly	  weakened	  the	  LDP’s	  support	  base.	  	  The	  diminished	   importance	  of	  particularistic	   spending	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	   further	  shift	  in	  emphasis	  from	  the	  personal	  attributes	  of	  politicians	  running	  for	  office,	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  the	   party	   platform	   and	   party	   identity	   each	   candidate	   belonged	   to.	   The	   increase	   in	   the	  number	  of	  unorganized	  voters	  meant	  that	  policy	  substance	  increased	  in	  importance,	  and	  so	  did	   party	   manifestos.	   In	   particular,	   after	   the	   Koizumi	   reforms,	   electoral	   politics	   changed	  after	  2005	  (Reed,	  Scheiner	  and	  Thies	  2012).	  	  Although	  these	  changes	  were	  effectively	  implemented	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  it	  had	  large	  ramifications	  for	  local	  politics	  as	  well.	   	  Although	  many	  local	  politicians	  were	  officially	  non-­‐partisan,	  they	  were	  in	  fact	  affiliated	  with	  local	  party	  organizations	  of	  the	  LDP	  or	  DPJ	  etc.,	  or	  were	  in	  the	  personal	  support	  groups	  of	  Lower	  House	  politicians.	  Local	  politicians	  were	  also	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employed	  by	  national	  politicians	  as	  ‘foot	  soldiers’	  for	  national	  election	  campaigns.	  This	  close	  relationship	  meant	  that	  changes	  effected	  at	  the	  national	  level	  were	  echoed	  at	  the	  local	  level	  as	  well,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  manifestos	  in	  local	  elections	  gained	  importance	  (Saito	  2010).	  	  	  
2.3	  EXPLAINING	  THE	  HIGH	  DEGREE	  OF	  CONFORMITY	  AMONG	  PARTY	  MANIFESTOS	  	  	  
The	   electoral	   and	   political	   reforms	   did	   eliminate	   intra-­‐party	   competition,	   diminish	   the	  importance	  of	   factions	  and	   increase	   the	   importance	  of	  party	   image.	  However,	   this	  did	  not	  result	   in	   a	   corresponding	   shift	   to	   a	   system	   where	   issues	   and	   principles	   rather	   than	  constituency	   service	   dominate	   policymaking.	   In	   other	   words,	   manifestos	   failed	   to	   evolve	  into	  the	  key	  component	  that	  ensured	  that	  Japanese	  politics	  transformed	  into	  the	  ideal	  two-­‐party,	  policy-­‐based	  model	  that	  was	  hoped	  for	  by	  many.	  A	  cursory	  examination	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  great	  similarities	  between	  manifestos	  of	  different	  parties,	  where	  policy	  suggested	  and	  stances	  on	  issues	  are	  not	  clearly	  differentiated	  a	  long	  a	  left-­‐right	  continuum.	  (As	  can	  be	  also	   observed	   in	   Sections	   5	   and	   6)	  manifestos	   tell	   a	   strikingly	   similar	   story	   and	   expound	  same	  values	  on	  both	  the	  national	  and	  local	  level	  (Curtis	  2004).	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  phenomenon	  has	  been	  attributed	  primarily	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  ideological	  cleavages	  in	  the	  population	  that	  has	  led	  to	  a	  general	  congregation	  of	  voters’	  stances	  towards	  the	  center	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  High	  speed	  economic	  growth	  have	  drastically	  increased	  the	  general	  standard	  of	  living,	  where	  affluence	  and	  relatively	  low	  inequality	  have	  created	  a	  large	  middle-­‐income	  group	  that	  face	  largely	  the	  same	  issues	  and	  problems.	  That	   the	   Japanese	  society	   is	   largely	  homogenous	  also	  greatly	  contributes	   to	   the	  lack	   of	   social	   cleavages	   and	   differences	   in	   society	   that	   parties	   can	   leverage	   upon	   to	  differentiate	   themselves	   from	  other	   parties	   and	   appeal	   to	   a	   specific	   group	   of	   voters.	   This	  creates	   a	   centrifugal	   force	   that	   pulls	   party	   platforms	   towards	   the	   center	   to	   appeal	   to	   the	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median	  voter	  (Down	  1957),	  and	  is	  evident	  not	  only	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  but	  also	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  This	  issue	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  Japan,	  where	  Western	  democracies	  also	  face	  the	  situation	  where	  ‘the	  ideological	  issues	  dividing	  left	  and	  right	  have	  been	  reduced	  to	  a	  little	  more	  or	  a	  little	   less	   government	   ownership	   and	   economic	   planning’,	   primarily	   because	   the	   main	  political	   problems	   that	   industrialization	   had	   brought	  with	   it	   have	   been	   solved	   (Rousseas	  and	  Farganis	  1968).	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   I	   believe	   this	   is	   only	   part	   of	   the	   argument.	   Due	   to	   the	  different	  bases	  of	  support	  parties	  maintain	  (agricultural	  communities	  for	  the	  LDP	  and	  urban	  constituents	   for	   the	   DPJ),	   the	   convergence	   of	   overall	   voter	   preferences	   seem	   to	   be	  insufficient	   in	  accounting	   for	   the	  high	  degree	  of	  uniformity	  among	   local	  party	  manifestos.	  Moreover,	   it	  would	  make	   sense	   for	   political	   parties	   to	   distinguish	   themselves	   from	   other	  parties	  by	  responding	  more	  aggressively	  to	  the	  calls	  for	  change	  from	  below,	  yet	  parties	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  doing	  so.	  	  Hence,	  I	  next	  examine	  a	  third	  factor	  to	  explain	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  uniformity	  across	  policies	  proposed	   by	   different	   local	   parties:	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   central	   and	   local	  governments.	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3. CENTRAL-­‐LOCAL	  RELATIONS	  
The	  institutional	  framework	  in	  which	  the	  local	  and	  central	  governments	  operate	  affects	  the	  costs	  of	   interactions	  between	  these	  governmental	  bodies	  (Takao	  1999),	  and	  these	  costs	   in	  turn	   affect	   the	   way	   in	   which	   governments	   behave	   in	   response	   to	   citizens’	   demands	   and	  pressure	  from	  other	  governmental	  bodies.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  expectation	  that	  a	  common	  leadership	   or	   ideology	   under	   the	   same	   party	  would	   ensure	   that	   policies	   implemented	   by	  central	  and	  local	  governments	  complement	  each	  other,	  or	  that	  central	  and	  local	  politicians	  necessarily	  support	  each	  other,	  may	  not	  hold	  by	  default.	  Local	  politicians	  require	  incentives	  to	  work	  together	  with	  national	  politicians	  and	  the	  central	  government	  (Lucardi	  and	  Rosas	  2013).	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   they	  are	  also	  constrained	  by	  national	   regulations	  circumscribing	  their	  authority	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  central	  government,	  and	  also	  by	  party	  rules.	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  in	   turn	   influences	   the	   behavioral	   patterns	   of	   local	   political	   parties,	   where	   recognition	   of	  these	   costs	   and	   restraints	   that	   local	   governments	   face	   translates	   into	   campaign	   promises	  that	  reflect	  the	  limitations	  faced	  by	  local	  governments.	  	  Local	   politicians,	   being	   directly	   elected	   by	   the	   people,	   are	   held	   accountable	   for	   their	  actions	  and	  are	  forced	  to	  be	  more	  responsive	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  local	  citizens.	  Direct	  elections	  also	  provide	  a	  means	   through	  which	   local	  politicians	  held	   to	   the	  promises	   they	  make	  and	  are	  judged	  by	  the	  electorate	  on	  how	  well	  they	  fulfill	  their	  campaign	  promises	  and	  perform	  in	  office.	  Incumbents	  who	  perform	  well	  get	  re-­‐elected,	  while	  those	  who	  fail	  to	  do	  so	  are	  not	  (Fisher	   and	   Hobolt	   2010).	   This	   means	   that	   political	   parties	   cannot	   make	   wild	   campaign	  promises	  that	  are	  beyond	  their	  abilities	  to	  fulfill,	  and	  that	  party	  platforms	  and	  promises	  are	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  actual	  power	  of	  local	  governments.	  	  Several	   theories	   describing	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   local	   government	   and	   the	  center	  have	  been	  proposed,	  with	  models	  proposing	  different	  levels	  of	  control	  the	  center	  has	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over	  local	  governments	  and	  different	  degrees	  of	  influence	  local	  governments	  have	  over	  the	  center.	   The	   dominant	   model	   is	   what	   Muramatsu	   (1988)	   calls	   the	   vertical	   administrative	  model,	   where	   local	   governments	   lack	   autonomy	   and	   are	   subordinate	   to	   the	   central	  government.	   However,	   the	   rise	   in	   the	   level	   of	   civil	   consciousness	   in	   Japanese	   society,	  increased	  leadership	  roles	  of	  local	  politicians	  and	  leaders,	  greater	  influence	  by	  civil	  groups	  and	  NGOs	  etc.	   since	   the	  1970s	  have	   led	   to	  greater	   influence	  and	   input	  by	   local	  politicians	  and	   governments	   on	   both	   local	   and	   national	   politics.	   Many	   therefore	   contend	   that	   the	  Japanese	   local	   government	   has	   greater	   autonomy	   than	   commonly	   perceived	   (Reed	   1986;	  Samuels	  1983)	  One	  of	  the	  new	  models	  that	  has	  emerged	  is	  the	  interdependent	  relationship	  model,	   which	   includes	   elements	   of	   the	   vertical	   administrative	   model,	   but	   places	   greater	  emphasis	   on	   the	   plurality	   of	   points	   of	   influence	   in	   local	   governments	   (Muramatsu,	   Local	  Power	   in	   the	   Japanese	   State	   1988).	   While	   there	   are	   other	   models	   that	   downplay	   the	  importance	  of	  the	  center,	  the	  strong	  financial	  and	  administrative	  control	  the	  center	  still	  has	  over	   local	   governments	   suggest	   that	   such	  models	   may	   not	   appropriately	   describe	   in	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  center	  and	  local	  governments	  today.	  	  Here,	   I	   briefly	   explain	   the	   models	   of	   central-­‐local	   relations	   and	   subsequently	   examine	  pattern	  of	  policy	  proposals	  in	  light	  of	  these	  models.	  	  
	  
3.1	  MODELS	  OF	  CENTRAL-­‐LOCAL	  RELATIONS	  
The	   four	   models	   of	   central-­‐local	   relations	   explained	   below	   are	   modified	   from	   the	   ones	  developed	   by	  Muramatsu	   (1988),	   but	   move	   beyond	  Muramatsu’s	   emphasis	   on	   degree	   of	  competition	   between	   local	   governments	   by	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	   power	   of	   the	  central	  government.	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  The	  table	  below	  illustrates	  the	  models	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations:	  	  	   Degree	  of	  Control	  the	  Center	  has	  over	  Local	  Governments	  
Influence	  Local	  
Governments	  have	  
over	  the	  Center	  
	   Low	   High	  	  
Low	   Local	  governments	  and	  the	  center	  operate	  relatively	  independently	  –	  mutual	  independence	  
The	  Vertical	  Administrative	  Model	  
High	   The	  Horizontal	  Competition	  Model	   The	  Interdependent	  Relationship	  Model	  
Table	  3.1	  Models	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations	  	  The	   institutional	   structure	  of	   the	   Japanese	   government	  makes	   it	   highly	   centralized	   and	   is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  unitary	  states	  (Takao	  1992;	  Shirai	  2006).	  Because	  of	  its	  highly	  centralized	  nature,	  the	  central	  government	  still	  exerts	  a	  strong	  influence	  over	  local	  governments,	  such	  that	   the	  models	   in	   the	   column	   ‘Low’	   under	   ‘Degree	   of	   Control	   the	   Center	   has	   over	   Local	  Governments’	  are	  included	  more	  for	  reference	  and	  comparison	  rather	  than	  for	  their	  actual	  applicability	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Japan	  today.	   	  3.1.1	  MUTUAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  In	   this	   model,	   the	   central	   government	   has	   low	   control	   over	   local	   governments,	   and	  conversely,	   local	   governments	   also	   do	   not	   affect	   the	   center	   much.	   There	   are	   hardly	   any	  examples	   of	   this	   relationship	   between	   local	   and	   central	   governments	   in	   Japan.	   This	   is	   a	  better	  description	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  federal	  and	  state	  governments,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (Muramatsu,	  Local	  Power	  in	  the	  Japanese	  State	  1988).	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3.1.2	  THE	  HORIZONTAL	  COMPETITION	  MODEL	  In	   the	   horizontal	   competition	   model,	   local	   governments	   are	   posited	   to	   exert	   strong	  influence	   over	   the	   central	   government	   due	   to	   the	   high	   reliance	   of	   the	   center	   on	   local	  governments	  for	  implementation	  of	  policies.	  Here,	  competition	  among	  local	  governments	  is	  a	   potent	   force	   in	   shaping	   the	   formulation	   and	   implementation	   of	   nation-­‐wide	   policies	  (Muramatsu,	   Local	   Power	   in	   the	   Japanese	   State	   1988).	   Local	   governments	   are	   forced	   to	  respond	  to	  demands	  and	  changing	  needs	  of	  their	  localities	  as	  are	  other	  governments,	  as	  not	  doing	  so	  would	  raise	  the	  ire	  of	  voters	  in	  the	  prefecture	  and	  endanger	  the	  party's	  chances	  of	  re-­‐election.	   When	   such	   responses	   are	   coordinated	   across	   local	   governments,	   this	   has	   a	  significant	  impact	  over	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  central	  ministries,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  can	  force	  the	  central	  government	  to	  adopt	  and	  implement	  them	  on	  a	  nationwide	  basis	  (Reed	  1982).	  However,	   although	   there	   have	   been	   instances	   where	   policies	   initiated	   by	   local	  governments	   resulted	   in	   subsequent	  adoption	  by	   the	  central	  government	   (eg.	   free	  elderly	  medical	   care),	   Muramatsu	   and	   Ito	   (1986)	   found	   that	   significant	   differences	   between	  prefectures	  and	  localities	  mean	  that	  such	  nation-­‐wide	  coordination	  is	  uncommon.	  Although	  the	  horizontal	  competition	  model	  may	  explain	  specific	  instances	  where	  nation-­‐wide	  policies	  are	  shaped	  after	  policies	  initiated	  in	  localities,	  this	  does	  not	  hold	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  is	  not	  a	  suitable	  model	  to	  describe	  the	  overall	  central-­‐local	  relationship	  in	  Japan.	  However,	  this	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	   local	  governments	  are	  completely	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  the	  central	  government.	  The	   Japanese	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Local	  Government	  Law	  grant	   local	  governments	  more	  authority	  than	  other	  unitary	  states	  such	  as	  Britain	  and	  France	  (although	  they	  grant	  local	  governments	  less	  power	  than	  in	  federal	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Germany)	  (Reed	  1986).	  Moreover,	  although	  local	  taxes	  account	  for	  only	  about	  a	  third	  of	  local	  revenues	  –	  in	  FY2010,	  local	  taxes	  accounted	  for	  35.2%	  of	  local	  government	  revenues	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(Ministry	   of	   Internal	   Affairs	   and	   Communications	   2012)	   –	   the	   heavy	   dependence	   of	   the	  central	   government	   on	   local	   governments	   to	   carry	   out	   programs	   and	   implement	   policies	  throughout	  the	  nation	  gives	   local	  government	  an	   lever	  to	  exert	   their	   influence	  and	  ensure	  that	  their	  voices	  are	  heard	  by	  the	  center	  (Takao	  1999).	  	  	  3.1.3	  THE	  VERTICAL	  ADMINISTRATIVE	  MODEL	  	  	  The	  vertical	  administrative	  model	   is	  most	  often	  used	  to	  describe	  Japan’s	  widely-­‐perceived	  highly	  centralized,	  unitary	  political	  system	  where	  the	  center	  extends	  broad	  and	  tight	  control	  over	  local	  governments	  (Jain,	  Japan's	  Local	  Governance	  at	  the	  Crossroads:	  The	  Third	  Wave	  of	   Reform	   2000).	   There	   are	   mainly	   two	   types	   of	   regulatory	   centralization:	   agents	   of	  delegated	  power	   and	   grants-­‐in-­‐aid	  programs	   (Takao	  1999),	   and	  both	   are	  part	   of	   the	   four	  key	   factors	   that	   make	   up	   this	   model:	   1)	   agents	   of	   delegated	   power;	   2)	   financial	  relationships;	   3)	   administrative	   of	   personnel;	   and	   4)	   dynamics	   of	   the	   administrative	  process	  (Muramatsu,	  Local	  Power	  in	  the	  Japanese	  State	  1988).	  Firstly,	   agents	   of	   delegated	   power	   –	   mayors	   and	   governors	   –	   alone	   have	   decision-­‐making	  powers	  over	  the	  policies	  delegated	  to	  local	  governments	  from	  the	  center.	  Before	  the	  revision	   of	   the	   Local	   Autonomy	   Law	   in	   1952	   (Matsufuji	   2011),	   local	   assemblies	   could	   do	  little	  more	  than	  debate	  about	  the	  tasks	  delegated	  to	  local	  governments,	  and	  had	  virtually	  no	  say	   over	   its	   implementation	   and	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   Legal	   relations	   between	  the	  agents	  of	  delegated	  power	  and	  the	  central	  government	  ensured	  that	  policies	  dictated	  by	  the	  central	  government	  would	  be	  implemented.	  Secondly,	   strong	   limitations	   on	   the	   taxing	   authority	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	  responsibilities	  of	  local	  governments	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  services	  such	  as	  provision	  of	  social	   services,	   better	   housing,	   improved	   education	   etc.	   mean	   that	   local	   governments	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depend	  heavily	  on	   subsidies	   and	  grants	   from	   the	   central	   government	   to	   fulfill	   their	   roles.	  Local	  governments	  are	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  the	  national	  government	  for	  funding	  through	  subsidies	   and	   its	   grants-­‐in-­‐aid	   system,	   in	  which	   a	   section	   of	   a	   particular	   central	  ministry	  directs	  the	  administration	  of	  a	  specific	  grant	  program	  to	  the	  prefectural	  government.	  	  Thirdly,	   the	   transfer	  of	   administrative	  officials	   from	   the	  central	   to	   local	  governments	  ensures	   that	   uniform	   administrative	   standards	   consistent	  with	   that	   found	   at	   the	   national	  level	   are	   established	   in	   local	   governments.	   Bureaucrats	   that	   move	   between	   central	  ministries	   and	   local	   offices	   form	   important	   lines	   of	   communication	   between	   local	  governments	  and	  the	  center.	  Lastly,	   the	   administrative	   process	   where	   central	   bureaucrats	   who	   prepare	   budget	  drafts	  for	  the	  following	  year	  consult	  local	  officials	  to	  determine	  their	  budget	  positions	  in	  the	  following	  year	   is	  an	   important	  way	   through	  which	   the	  needs	  of	   localities	  are	  conveyed	   to	  the	   central	   government.	   As	   actual	   implementation	   of	   policies	   by	   central	  ministries	   fall	   to	  local	  officials,	  their	  demands	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  for	  smooth	  administration	  in	  localities.	  	  Agents	   of	   delegated	   power,	   lack	   of	   fiscal	   autonomy	   and	   transfer	   of	   administrative	  officials	  from	  the	  center	  to	  local	  governments	  ‘defer[red]	  development	  of	   .	   .	   .	   local	  political	  process[es]’	  in	  which	  citizens	  actively	  voiced	  their	  opinions	  and	  took	  responsibility	  to	  steer	  policies	   in	   a	   way	   that	   reflected	   their	   own	   interests.	   Instead,	   strong	   links	   to	   and	   high	  dependence	   on	   the	   central	   government	   resulted	   in	   ‘one-­‐way	   and	   submissive	   act[s]	   of	  petitioning	   and	   lobbying	   to	   central	   authority’	   and	   highly	   limited	   local	   government	  autonomy	  (Takao	  1999).	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Evolution	  Away	  from	  the	  Vertical	  Administrative	  Model	  The	  vertical	  administrative	  model	  was	  easy	  to	  sustain	  when	  there	  was	  sustained	  economic	  growth.	  The	   expanding	  pie	  made	   it	   easier	   to	   satisfy	   everyone,	   the	   consensus	  of	   economic	  growth	  as	  a	  national	  goal	  justified	  the	  highly-­‐centralized	  state	  and	  explained	  the	  absence	  of	  conflicting	   demands	   from	   localities.	   In	   a	   way,	   Japan	   was	   a	   victim	   of	   her	   own	   economic	  success.	   Rapid	   economic	   growth	   brought	   about	   severe	   pollution	   deterioration	   of	   the	  environment,	  and	  social	  welfare	  failed	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  evolving	  needs	  of	  citizens	  (Reed	  1986).	   The	   subsequent	   slowdown	   in	   growth	   in	   the	   late	   1980s,	   increased	   affluence,	   and	   a	  shift	  of	  attention	   from	  maximizing	  economic	  growth	   to	  citizens’	  welfare	  and	  protection	  of	  the	   environment	   led	   to	   calls	   for	   reforms	   to	   the	   political	   system	   to	   better	   take	   into	  consideration	   the	  needs	  of	   citizens.	  This	   led	   to	  citizens’	  movements	  emerging	   in	   the	  early	  1970s	  that	  became	  important	  forces	  that	  catalyzed	  political	  reform.	  The	  rise	  of	  progressive	  political	   parties,	   which	   rode	   on	   voters’	   increasing	   dissatisfaction	   with	   the	   conservative	  government	   and	   captured	   increasing	   number	   of	   votes,	   also	   pushed	   local	   and	   national	  governments	   to	   implement	   reforms	   in	   line	   with	   citizens’	   demands	   (Muramatsu,	   Local	  Power	   in	   the	   Japanese	   State	   1988).	   Moreover,	   a	   series	   of	   high-­‐profile	   scandals	   involving	  politicians	   and	   bureaucrats	   also	   resulted	   in	   open	   popular	   support	   for	   local	   government	  reforms.	  	  Therefore,	   reforms	   in	   the	   early	  1990s	  were	   centered	  on	   two	  goals:	   1)	   increasing	   the	  government	   efficiency	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   economic	   slowdown;	   and	   2)	   eradicating	   political	  corruption	  that	  has	  surfaced	  repeatedly	  in	  preceding	  years.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  globalization	  and	   technological	   advancement	   subjected	   politicians	   and	   bureaucrats	   to	   more	   external	  checks	   and	  balances.	   The	  media	   threatened	   to	   expose	   abuses	   of	   power,	   and	   globalization	  kept	   governments	   on	   their	   toes.	   These	   further	   pushed	   the	   case	   for	   greater	   political	   and	  administrative	   reform.	   Yet	   legislative	   changes	   in	   the	   1990s	   that	   aimed	   to	   devolve	   some	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functions	  from	  the	  center	  to	  local	  governments	  failed	  to	  effect	  its	   intended	  changes	  due	  to	  entrenched	   interests	   of	   national	   bureaucrats	   and	   politicians	  who	   clung	   on	   to	   power.	   The	  legislative	   changes	  did	   result	   in	   a	   transfer	   of	   power	  –	  but	   only	   in	  name	  and	  not	   in	   actual	  control	  (Jain,	  Japan's	  Local	  Governance	  at	  the	  Crossroads:	  The	  Third	  Wave	  of	  Reform	  2000).	  	  Jain	  (2000)	  classifies	  the	  reforms	  in	  the	  1990s	  as	  a	  reform	  simultaneously	  from	  the	  top	  down	   and	   the	   bottom	  up.	   ‘Bottom	  up’	   suggests	   that	   demands	   of	   citizens	   and	   inputs	   from	  actors	   other	   than	   the	   central	   government	   are	   playing	   increasingly	   important	   roles	   in	   the	  political	   scene	   in	   prefectures.	   Rise	   of	   the	   social	   media	   increases	   the	   volume	   of	   citizens’	  voices	  in	  the	  political	  process	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  government,	  while	  increasing	  numbers	   of	   social	   organizations	   such	   as	   Non-­‐Profit	   Organizations	   (NPOs)	   and	   Non-­‐Governmental	   Organizations	   (NGOs)	   provide	   information	   to	   the	   public	   and	   establish	  platforms	  for	  aggregation	  of	  otherwise	  diffused	  social	  interests	  (Kim	  2011).	  These	  points	  of	  influence	  and	  increased	  number	  of	  actors	  playing	  active	  roles	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  as	  well	   as	   the	   evolving	   relationship	   between	  both	   the	   local	   and	   central	   governments	   and	  among	  local	  governments	  themselves	  have	  led	  to	  new	  models	  of	  central-­‐local	  relationships	  being	  developed.	  	  	  3.1.4	  THE	  INTERDEPENDENT	  RELATIONSHIP	  MODEL	  The	  interdependent	  relationship	  model	  suggested	  by	  Muramatsu	  (1988)	  is	  one	  where	  there	  is	  a	  more	  equal	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments.	  Here,	  policy	  directions	   from	   central	   ministries	   are	   considered	   alongside	   initiatives	   from	   local	  governmental	   organizations,	   and	   public	   policies	   are	   designed	   and	   implemented	   with	  interests	   of	   both	   in	   mind.	   This	   interaction	   and	   cooperation	   takes	   place	   in	   many	   forms,	  where	   the	   most	   common	   mode	   of	   interaction	   is	   one	   where	   the	   central	   ministry	   has	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overarching	   control	   over	   the	   details	   of	   implementation	   of	   policies,	   even	   if	   such	   tasks	   are	  delegated	  to	  local	  governments	  to	  be	  actually	  carried	  out.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  local	  governments	   often	   express	   their	   views	   in	   the	   process	   of	   implementation	   and	   even	   enter	  into	  conflicts	  with	  the	  central	  ministry	  due	  to	  divergent	  interests	  and	  viewpoints.	  This	  interdependent	  relationship	  model	  is	  possible	  only	  when	  local	  governments	  have	  political	  resources	  and	  are	  able	  to	  use	  them.	  Muramatsu	  (1988)	  contended	  that	  starting	  in	  the	   late	  1960s,	   local	  governments	  were	  able	  to	  accumulate	  and	  use	  the	  political	  resources	  necessary	  to	  assert	  themselves	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  central	  government.	  Local	  officials	  must	  act	  within	  the	  political	  and	  electoral	  constraints	  they	  face,	  but	  are	  also	  able	  to	  assert	  themselves	  in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   central	   government	   because	   the	   central	   government	   depends	   on	   local	  officials	   to	   carry	   out	   and	   successfully	   implement	   national	   policies	   and	   central	   objectives	  (Hill	  and	  Fujita	  2000).	  Because	  all	  organizations	  do	  not	  possess	  all	  the	  resources	  they	  need,	  they	  depend	  on	  other	  organizations	  to	  fulfill	  their	  objectives	  (Rhodes	  1982).	  Moreover,	  the	  rise	   in	  non-­‐partisan	  voters	  who	  pay	  more	  attention	   to	  policies	  means	   that	  parties	   in	   local	  governments	   now	   have	   to	   take	   into	   greater	   consideration	   voters’	   demands.	   Local	  governments	  may	   consequently	   look	   to	   exercise	   greater	   autonomy	   from	   the	   center	   to	   be	  able	  to	  better	  respond	  to	  voters	  with	  greater	  flexibility	  and	  specificity.	  	  However,	   local	   governments	   face	   a	   ‘dilemma’	   between	   greater	   autonomy	   and	   more	  resources	   from	   the	   central	   government	   to	   carry	   out	   policies.	   Extensive	   control	   over	  administrative	   and	   financial	   resources	   by	   the	   central	   government	   creates	   the	   situation	  whereby	   local	   governments	   depend	   on	   central	   governments	   for	   resources	   to	   carry	   out	  policies	  and	  public	  services	  demanded	  by	  the	  people.	  The	  central	  government	  provides	  the	  experts	  and	  grants	  local	  governments	  the	  authority	  to	  carry	  out	  projects	  or	  provide	  certain	  services.	  Limited	  authority	  over	  local	  taxes	  and	  issuance	  of	  local	  bonds	  create	  the	  situation	  in	   which	   local	   tax	   revenues	   cover	   only	   a	   third	   of	   local	   expenditure	   and	   force	   local	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governments	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  central	  government	  for	  funding	  (Shirai	  2006).	  These	  funding	  and	  assistance	  from	  the	  central	  government	  often	  come	  with	  strings	  attached	  –	  conditions	  specifying	   how	   these	   funds	   can	   be	   used	   or	   circumstances	   etc.	   Yet	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  desire	  for	  greater	  autonomy	  to	  better	  respond	  to	  demands	  from	  local	  residents	  also	  means	  that	   local	   governments	   attempt	   to	   free	   themselves	   from	   the	   influences	   of	   the	   central	  government	   and	   assert	   their	   authority	   through	  policy	   initiatives	  or	  by	  deviating	   from	   the	  central	  government’s	  policy	  preferences.	  	  Local	   governments	   therefore	   face	   the	   problem	   of	   balancing	   expectations	   from	   local	  voters	   and	   toeing	   the	   line	   drawn	   by	   the	   central	   government	   to	   obtain	   the	   resources	  necessary	   to	   provide	   services	   and	   public	   goods.	   Local	   officials,	   being	   directly	   elected	   in	  electoral	   cycles,	   have	   to	   be	   responsive	   to	   voters’	   demands.	   Yet	   over-­‐stressing	   the	  independence	   of	   local	   governments	   and	   sidelining	   the	   directives	   from	   the	   central	  government	   may	   result	   in	   a	   situation	   where	   local	   governments	   cannot	   expect	   to	   obtain	  administrative	  help	  or	  resources	   from	  the	  central	  government	  (Muramatsu	  1988;	  Hill	  and	  Fujita	  2000).	  	  
3.2	  MANIFESTOS	  AND	  CENTRAL-­‐LOCAL	  RELATIONS	  
Seen	   in	   this	   light,	   the	   promises	   by	   political	   parties	   in	   their	   campaign	   manifestos	   are	  constrained	   by	   the	   degree	   of	   autonomy	   local	   governments	   enjoy.	   Local	   politicians	   face	  having	   to	   satisfy	   the	   demands	   of	   local	   voters,	   and	   do	   so	   by	   tackling	   the	   least	   ‘expensive’	  demands	   –	   demands	   that	   are	   aligned	   with	   the	   intentions	   of	   central	   ministries	   and	   the	  central	   government,	   which	   therefore	   generate	   the	   least	   friction	   between	   the	   central	   and	  local	   governments.	   These	   demands	   such	   as	   ‘increasing	   educational	   standards	   of	   schools	  within	   the	   prefecture’	   or	   ‘more	   comprehensive	   care	   for	   the	   elderly	   and	   the	   disabled’	   are	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concerns	  of	  local	  residents	  but	  are	  also	  objectives	  of	  the	  central	  government.	  Centering	  on	  these	  policies,	  therefore,	  allow	  local	  governments	  to	  satisfy	  both	  sides	  simultaneously.	  Conversely,	   more	   controversial	   and	   ‘dangerous’	   promises	   such	   as	   administrative	  reforms	   and	   policies	   concerning	   controversial	   projects	   such	   as	   construction	   of	   dams	   are	  visibly	   less	   commonly	   found	   in	   party	  manifestos.	   Promises	   for	   administrative	   reform	   are	  made	  partially	   in	   response	   to	   calls	  by	   the	  public	   for	  greater	   transparency	  and	   for	   cleaner	  politics	  within	  the	  government,	  but	  carries	  the	  risk	  of	  running	  afoul	  of	  politically	  powerful	  groups	   within	   the	   central	   government	   and	   other	   governmental	   bodies.	   Conversely,	  controversial	  local	  projects	  often	  face	  opposition	  from	  local	  residents	  due	  to,	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  case	  of	  dam	  construction,	  disruption	  of	  normal	  lives	  and	  forced	  resettlements,	  although	  most	  of	   these	  projects	  are	  commissioned	  by	  central	  ministries	  often	   for	   flood	  control	  and	  water	  management	  (Toshiko	  1999).	  	  Local	   governments	   therefore	   face	   a	   dilemma	   when	   proposing	   policies:	   insisting	   on	  policies	  that	  are	   in	   line	  with	  central	  government	  preferences	  but	  are	  unpopular	  with	   local	  voters	  endangers	  the	  chances	  of	  reelection	  by	  local	  parties,	  but	  going	  completely	  along	  with	  the	  demands	  of	   local	  voters	  on	   issues	  that	   the	  central	  government	  opposes	  endangers	  the	  pipeline	  that	  local	  governments	  depend	  on	  to	  implement	  their	  policies	  and	  provide	  services.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  this	  recognition	  and	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  the	  demands	  and	  expectations	  on	  both	  sides	  that	  constraints	  the	  campaign	  promises	  of	  parties	  running	  for	  local	  governments.	  	  	   Of	  course,	  proposals	  in	  manifestos	  could	  also	  very	  well	  reflect	  the	  very	  policies	  that	  the	  people	  are	  most	  concerned	  about,	  and	  parties	  are	  merely	  reflecting	  what	  is	  on	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  people	  themselves.	  While	  this	  may	  be	  true,	   I	  believe	  that	  this	  explains	  only	  part	  of	  the	  question.	  Policy	  matters	  such	  as	  care	  for	  the	  elderly,	  childcare,	  and	  better	  medical	  facilities	  and	   more	   personnel	   may	   occupy	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	   people’s	   concerns,	   but	   calls	   for	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fundamental	  changes	  to	  the	  system	  are	  real.1	  A	  survey	   in	  2001	  showed	  that	  among	  voters	  who	  did	  not	  support	  the	  LDP,	  more	  than	  66%	  of	  respondents	  cited	  the	  way	  politics	  was	  run	  by	  the	  LDP	  as	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  they	  did	  not	  support	  the	  party	  (Lin	  2009).	  Parties	  that	  attempt	   to	   address	   such	   changes	   are	   likely	   to	   capture	   the	   votes	   of	   these	   people.	   Many	  politicians	  at	  the	  national	   level	  and	  prominent	  figures	  in	  society	  have	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  reform	  of	  the	  political	  system.	  On	  March	  3,	  2008,	  for	  example,	  a	  group	  of	  approximately	  150	   politicians	   from	   the	   LDP,	   the	   DPJ	   and	   members	   of	   the	   academia	   and	   business	  communities	   initiated	   a	   political	  movement	   called	   ‘Sentaku’	   –	   which	  means	   both	   ‘choice’	  and	  ‘washing	  clean’	  –	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  remedying	  the	  flaws	  in	  the	  political	  system	  and	  move	  towards	   the	   ideal	   two-­‐party,	   platform-­‐based	   political	   system	   where	   voters	   depend	   on	  ‘coherent	  manifestos’	  rather	  than	  personalized	  politics	  to	  cast	  their	  votes	  (EIU	  2008).	  	  An	  instance	  whereby	  change	  has	  been	  demanded	  and	  initiated	  in	  the	  localities	  is	  in	  the	  area	  of	  environmental	  regulation.	  Certain	   localities,	   frustrated	  at	   the	  central	  government’s	  reluctance	   to	   implement	   stricter	   environmental	   protection	   standards	   to	   protect	   local	  residents	   against	   increasingly	   severe	   pollution,	   took	   the	   initiative	   to	   put	   in	   place	   stricter	  standards	  and	  regulations.	  One	  example	  of	  such	  a	   locality	   is	   the	  city	  of	  Kitakyushu,	  whose	  anti-­‐pollution	  measures	  subsequently	  caught	  international	  attention	  and	  spawned	  ties	  with	  other	  cities	  and	  international	  bodies.	  Citizens	  and	  private	  organizations	  themselves	  took	  it	  upon	  themselves	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  research	  needed	  to	  determine	  the	  damage	  done	  and	  what	  should	  be	  implemented	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  situation.	  These	  citizens	  then	  subsequently	  lobbied	  local	  assemblies	  and	  even	  legislatures	  to	  implement	  measures	  to	  improve	  their	  standards	  of	  living	   (Hitsumoto	   1996).	   In	   many	   instances,	   policies	   or	   stricter	   standards	   initiated	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	   for	  example:	  EIU	  2008,	   Japan	  Politics:	  Political	  Realignment?,	  EIU	  Newswire,	   June	  11;	  Takahashi,	  Kitazume,	  2010,	  Voter	  Behavior	  Holds	  Key	  to	  Political	  System	  Change,	  The	  Japan	  
Times,	  March	  26.	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localities	   were	   subsequently	   adopted	   nationwide	   (Jain,	   Japan's	   Local	   Governance	   at	   the	  Crossroads:	  The	  Third	  Wave	  of	  Reform	  2000).	  The	   impetus	   for	   such	   changes,	   therefore,	   is	   real	   and	   recognized	   by	   political	   leaders,	  both	   local	   and	   national.	   More	   specifically,	   since	   the	   1990s,	   public	   demands	   for	   a	   more	  transparent	  and	  responsive	  system	  of	  governance,	   rising	  discontent	  with	   flagrant	  political	  corruption	   and	   external	   factors	   such	   as	   globalization	   and	   the	   spread	   of	   information	  technology	  have	  also	  given	  local	  politicians	  the	  leverage	  and	  incentive	  to	  initiate	  change	  at	  the	  local	  level	  with	  greater	  independence	  from	  the	  center	  (Jain,	  Japan's	  Local	  Governance	  at	  the	  Crossroads:	  The	  Third	  Wave	  of	  Reform	  2000).	  Local	  politicians,	  increasingly,	  are	  setting	  policy	  agendas	  to	  fulfill	  the	  needs	  of	  particular	  localities	  rather	  than	  conforming	  blindly	  to	  directives	  from	  the	  central	  government.	  Yet	  although	  there	  is	  an	  increasingly	  stronger	  trend	  towards	   greater	   initiative-­‐taking	   by	   local	   governments,	   such	   instances	   are	   far	   from	  commonplace	  (Takao	  1999).	  I	  believe	  the	  reason	  why	  steps	  towards	  enacting	  such	  changes	  are	  limited	  can	  be	  at	  least	  partially	  explained	  by	  the	  restrictions	  facing	  local	  governments	  in	  light	  of	  the	  center-­‐local	  relationship	  as	  explained	  above.	  	  	  
3.3	  PREDICTED	  OBSERVABLE	  IMPLICATIONS	  
Given	  the	  above	  argument,	  examining	  the	  pattern	  of	  policies	   in	  manifestos	  can	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  central-­‐local	  relationship	  in	  Japan.	  If	  the	  vertical	  administrative	  model	  is	  indeed	  the	  prevailing	  model,	  then	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  sufficient	  administrative	  and	  fiscal	  support	  from	  the	  central	  government	  to	   implement	  policies,	   local	  parties,	  regardless	  of	  their	  affiliations,	  should	   have	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   conformity	   to	   central	   government	   policies.	   Even	   opposition	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parties2	  have	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  conformity	  to	  the	  ruling	  parties’	  policies,	  as	  if	  their	   proposed	   policies	   deviate	   too	   much	   from	   that	   of	   the	   center,	   their	   actual	   ability	   to	  implement	   those	   policies	   is	   likely	   to	   come	   under	   question.	   In	   other	   words,	   for	   their	  campaign	   promises	   to	   be	   credible,	   opposition	   parties	   would	   not	   have	   the	   incentive	   to	  propose	  policies	  that	  are	  starkly	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  central	  government.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  horizontal	  competition	  model	  is	  the	  relevant	  model,	  we	  would	  expect	   to	  see	   large	  differences	   in	   the	  manifestos	  as	  provinces	  compete	  with	  each	  other	   to	  implement	   policies	   in	   response	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   voters	   in	   different	   localities.	   Given	  differences	   in	   characteristics	   of	   prefectures	   in	   terms	   of	   demography,	   economic	   structure,	  level	  of	  wealth	  etc.,	  policies	  proposed	  by	  local	  parties	  should	  differ	  considerably	  depending	  on	  these	  characteristics	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  provinces.	  Here,	  proposals	  by	  different	  parties	  in	  the	   same	  prefecture	  would	   exhibit	   greater	   similarity	   than	  proposals	   from	   the	   same	  party	  but	   from	   different	   prefectures.	   Put	   simply,	   under	   the	   horizontal	   competition	   model,	   the	  characteristics	   of	   prefectures,	   rather	   than	   the	   party	   identity,	   determine	   the	   patterns	   of	  policy	  proposal,.	  A	   balance	   between	   the	   vertical	   administrative	  model	   and	   the	   horizontal	   competition	  model	   is	   the	   interdependent	   relationship	   model.	   Under	   the	   assumptions	   of	   this	   model,	  patterns	   of	   policy	   proposals	   should	   show	   some	   variation	   within	   parties	   between	  prefectures,	  and	  between	  parties	  within	  the	  same	  prefecture.	  Under	  this	  model,	  we	  expect	  that	  while	  local	  governments	  have	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  need	  of	  voters	  within	  the	  prefectures,	  their	   actions	   are	   also	   constrained	   by	   the	   control	   the	   center	   has	   over	   local	   governments.	  They	  have	  to	  show	  deference	  to	  the	  central	  government,	  and	  have	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  center	  while	  proposing	  policies	  within	  their	  localities.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Here,	   I	   refer	   to	  parties	  who	  are	  not	   the	  dominant	  party	   in	   the	   central	   government	   as	   ‘opposition	  parties’.	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autonomy	  derived	  from	  limited	  fiscal	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  the	  need	  to	  exhibit	  some	  degree	  of	   responsiveness	   to	   voters’	   demands	   mean	   that	   policies	   proposed	   will	   vary	   between	  parties	  and	  between	  prefectures,	  depending	  on	  their	  ties	  with	  the	  central	  government.	  	  	   A	  caveat	  must	  be	  included	  here.	  As	  it	  was	  the	  DPJ	  in	  power	  in	  the	  central	  government	  from	  2009	  to	  2012,	  one	  might	  assume	  that	  local	  DPJ	  parties	  were	  more	  tightly	  constrained	  to	  the	  central	  government	  in	  the	  2011	  prefectural	  assembly	  elections	  than	  local	  LDP	  parties.	  I	   contend	   that	   this	   is	  not	  necessarily	   true.	  Given	   that	  2009	   to	  2012	  was	   the	   first	   time	  any	  party	  defeated	  the	  long-­‐dominant	  LDP	  since	  1955,	  the	  supporting	  infrastructure	  for	  the	  DPJ	  central	  government	  was	  weak.	  The	  DPJ’s	  attempts	  to	  reform	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  centralize	  political	   power	   in	   the	   party	   instead	   (Arase	   2010)	   led	   to	   the	   partial	   breakdown	   of	   the	  traditional	  channels	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  ruling	  party	  and	  the	  bureaucracy.	  However,	  in	  the	  short	  period	  of	  time	  when	  the	  DPJ	  was	  in	  power,	  the	  DPJ	  was	  not	  able	  to	  fully	  build	  up	  its	  own	  bureaucratic	  and	  administrative	  infrastructural	  support	  system	  and	  transform	  itself	  into	  a	  mature	  ruling	  party	  like	  the	  LDP	  was	  (Tatsumi	  2013).	  The	  unique	  roles	  of	  the	  LDP’s	  Executive	  Council	   and	   the	  Policy	  Affairs	  Research	  Council	   in	   passing	   legislation	   (G.	   Curtis	  2004)	  and	  deep-­‐seated	  alliances	  between	  the	  LDP	  and	  the	  bureaucracy	  were	  not	  so	  easily	  replaced	  by	  new	  institutional	  structures.	  As	  such,	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true	  that	  the	  DPJ	  would	  be	  more	  constrained	  than	  the	  LDP	  politicians.	  Remnants	  of	  the	  old	  alliances	  and	  ties	  between	  LDP	  politicians,	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  members	  of	  the	  community	  still	  persist,	  and	   local	  LDP	  politicians	  have	   incentives	   to	  preserve	   these	   ties.	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  unclear	  at	  the	   outset	   as	   to	  whether	   the	   LDP	   or	   the	   DPJ	  would	   be	  more	   constrained.	   I	   examine	   this	  relation	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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4. SCOPE	  AND	  DETAILS	  OF	  MANIFESTO	  ANALYSIS	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   explain	  my	   decision	   to	   analyze	   local	   party	  manifestos	   and	   explicate	   the	  various	  components	  of	  my	  analysis.	  
	  
4.1	  ELECTION	  MANIFESTOS	  
Harmel	  et	  al.	  (1995)	  concluded	  that	  poor	  electoral	  performances	  are	  important	  stimuli	  for	  changes	   in	   party	   image.	   Party	   identity	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   front	   the	   party	   presents	   to	   the	  public,	  either	  through	  the	  public	  image	  of	  the	  party	  leader	  and/or	  its	  organizational	  face,	  or	  through	   the	   policies	   the	   party	   stands	   for.	   One	   particularly	   important	  way	   through	  which	  parties	   attempt	   to	   influence	   their	   identity	   is	   how	   they	   package	   their	   election	  manifestos	  through	  which	  they	  espouse	  their	  stances	  on	  various	  political	  issues.	  With	  increasing	  voter	  apathy	   and	   increasing	  dissatisfaction	   and	  disillusionment	  with	  political	   parties	   in	   Japan,	   I	  believe	  one	  way	  parties	  seek	  to	  change	  their	  image	  is	  through	  election	  manifestos.	  	  Though	   imperfect,	   manifestos	   are	   means	   of	   identifying	   party	   intent	   and	   indicating	  political	   priorities,	   and	   are	   important	   sources	   of	   information	   about	   the	   policy	   goals	   of	  parties	  (Ware	  1995).	  Some	  may	  argue	  that	  manifestos	  may	  represent	   little	  more	  than	   just	  political	  rhetoric	  and	  strategies	  employed	  to	  secure	  reelection,	  but	  this	  merely	  suggests	  that	  the	   presence	   of	   policies	   proposed	  may	   not	   be	  what	   the	   party	   truly	   intends	   to	   implement	  once	   in	   power.	   This,	   however,	   also	   suggests	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   policies	   proposed	   are	  significant	  in	  that	  it	  means	  that	  these	  policies	  are	  simply	  not	  on	  the	  radar	  of	  political	  parties.	  Political	   parties	   have	   little	   incentive	   not	   to	   include	   potentially	   popular	   policies	   in	   their	  manifestos	  if	  they	  intend	  to	  implement	  them,	  especially	  if	  these	  policies	  are	  popular	  and	  can	  increase	   the	   appeal	   of	   the	   party	   to	   voters.	   Policies	   that	   are	   not	   explicitly	   included	   in	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manifestos	   are,	   therefore,	   indicative	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   attention	   paid	   to	   it	   or	   an	   intention	   to	  implement	  those	  policies.	  	  While	  some	  may	  question	  whether	  promises	  made	  in	  manifestos	  are	  indeed	  kept	  when	  parties	  are	  elected	  into	  power,	  Bara	  (2005)	  shows	  that	  governments	  try,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  pledges	  they	  made	  while	  campaigning	  are	  indeed	  adhered	  to.	  This	  could	  be	   because	   parties	   are	   held	   accountable	   to	   their	   pledges	   and	   face	   the	   possibility	   of	   not	  getting	   re-­‐elected	   should	   they	   fail	   to	   keep	   their	   promises.	   It	   follows	   that	   the	   construct	   of	  election	  pledges	  –	  how	  they	  are	  phrased,	  the	  level	  of	  details	  included	  etc.	  –	  vary	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  certain	  a	  party	  is	  that	  it	  can	  carry	  out	  its	  promises	  when	  in	  power.	  	  	  
4.2	  THE	  LOCAL	  LEVEL	  
Being	   closer	   to	   the	   ground,	   local	   level	   politics	   would	   plausibly	   be	   the	   in	   the	   forefront	   of	  bringing	   about	   the	   changes	   that	   the	   people	  want	   as	   local	   governments	   are	   better	   able	   to	  identify	  popular	  demands	  and	  act	  to	  satisfy	  them	  (Hill	  and	  Fujita	  2000).	  As	  compared	  to	  the	  national	   government,	   local	   officials	   have	   a	   narrower	   range	   of	   issues	   to	   focus	   on,	   and	   are	  therefore	  able	  to	  be	  more	  responsive	  to	  needs	  and	  demands	  of	  citizens	  (Takao	  1999).	  Local	  political	   party	   leadership	   is	   also	   becoming	   an	   emerging	   catalyst	   for	   change	   in	   Japan’s	  political	  arena	   (Jain	  2004).	  Local	  governments	   in	   Japan	  have	  more	  power	   than	  commonly	  perceived	  –	   for	   instance,	  many	  national	  policies	  are	  results	  of	  policies	  being	   implemented	  locally	  in	  response	  to	  popular	  demand	  by	  one	  or	  two	  local	  governments,	  then	  subsequently	  adopted	  at	   the	  national	   level	   that	  reestablishes	  uniformity	  amongst	  all	   localities	  when	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  these	  policies	  become	  apparent	  (Reed,	  Is	  Japanese	  Government	  Really	  Centralized?	  1982).	  Consequently,	   I	   look	   to	  policymaking	  at	   the	   local	   level	   to	  explain	  why	  has	  political	  change	  not	  come	  more	  readily	  to	  Japan.	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Factors	  such	  as	  an	  absence	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  cleavages	  and	  centrifugal	  forces	  pulling	  political	   parties	   towards	   the	   center	   to	   appeal	   to	   the	   greatest	   number	   of	   voters	   are	  commonly	   cited	   as	   reasons	   for	   the	   high	   level	   of	   similarities	   across	   party	   manifestos.	  However,	   examining	   politics	   at	   the	   local	   level	   also	   brings	   another	   dimension	   into	   the	  analysis.	   Local	   governments	   are	   constrained	   by	   regulations	   demarcating	   their	   autonomy,	  and	  their	  independence	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  fiscal	  freedom	  they	  enjoy	  from	  the	   central	   government.	   Relations	   between	   the	   center	   and	   local	   governments	   are	   crucial	  factors	  that	  must	  be	  considered	  when	  examining	  policy	  change	  proposals	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  As	   such,	   I	   believe	   that	   another	   factor	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration:	   the	  recognition	   of	   limitations	   that	   local	   governments	   face	   constrains	   the	   ex-­‐ante	   policy	  proposals	   of	   political	   parties.	   In	   Sections	   5	   and	   6,	   I	   analyze	   the	   lack	   of	   intent	   of	   policy	  change	   as	   observed	   in	   party	  manifestos	   in	   local	   elections	   in	   light	   of	   constraints	   faced	   by	  local	  governments	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  center	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  why	  have	  more	  changes	  not	  been	  effected	  despite	  strong	  calls	  for	  such.	  	  
4.3	  CHOICE	  OF	  PARTIES	  
Manifestos	   from	   the	  only	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	   are	   examined,	  mainly	   for	   two	   reasons:	   1)	   the	  LDP	  and	   DPJ	   are	   the	   largest	   political	   parties	   in	   Japan	   with	   the	   biggest	   presences	   in	   Japan’s	  political	  arena	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  DPJ	  presents	  the	  greatest	  viable	  opposition	  to	  the	  LDP;	  and	   2)	   both	   are	   not	   ‘extreme’	   parties	   in	   the	   strategies	   employed	   by	   candidates	   and	   the	  parties	  sponsoring	  them	  are	  not	  entirely	  strategic	  or	  non-­‐strategic.	  	  The	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  are	  by	   far	   the	   largest	  and	  most	   influential	  political	  parties	   in	   Japan,	  both	  at	  the	  national	  and	  local	  levels.	  They	  accounted	  for	  80%	  of	  the	  vote	  choice	  in	  Japanese	  national	  elections	   in	  2003	  (Richey	  and	  Ikeda	  2006),	  and	  66%	  of	  district	  votes	  and	  43%	  of	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proportional	   representation	   votes	   in	   the	   2012	   election	   (Yomiuri	   2012).	   In	   both	   the	   2007	  and	  2011	  local	  elections,	  the	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  together	  accounted	  for	  63%	  of	  all	  seats	  (Ministry	  of	  Internal	  Affairs	  and	  Communications	  2007;	  2011).	  Although	  the	  DPJ	  plays	  a	  much	  smaller	  role	  in	  local	  elections	  than	  it	  does	  in	  national	  elections	  (it	  accounted	  for	  15%	  of	  the	  63%	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  2011	  local	  elections),	  it	  is	  the	  greatest	  challenger	  to	  the	  LDP	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  even	  smaller	  number	  of	  seats	  won	  by	  other	  parties	  like	  the	  Kōmeitō	  (7%)	  or	  the	  JCP	  (4%).	  Candidates	  from	  the	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  running	  in	  the	  2007	  elections	  made	  up	  39%	  and	  13%	  of	  all	  candidates	  respectively,	  dwarfing	  that	  of	  the	  Kōmeitō’s	  5%	  and	  JCP’s	  8%	  (Weiner	  2008).	  That	  not	  only	  the	  candidate	  bases	  were	  large	  but	  also	  that	  the	  percentages	  of	  seats	  won	  by	  the	   LDP	   and	   DPJ	   were	   high	   suggested	   that	   their	   manifestos	   not	   only	   ‘covered’	   a	   great	  proportion	  of	   the	  electorate,	  but	  were	  also	  not	  rejected	  by	   those	  who	  voted	   for	   these	   two	  parties.3	  Due	  to	  the	  large	  candidate	  bases	  these	  two	  parties	  combined	  have,	  examination	  of	  manifestos	   from	   the	   LDP	   and	   DPJ	  would	   together	   paint	   a	   broad	   and	   thorough	   picture	   of	  what	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  electorate	  have	  read.	  	  The	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  are	  parties	  that	  seek	  majority	  support	  (as	  opposed	  to	  parties	  such	  as	  the	  Japan	  Communist	  Party	  (JCP)	  or	  the	  Kōmeitō	  which	  are	  ‘niche’	  parties	  that	  do	  not	  look	  not	   to	  win	   support	   from	  a	  broad	  base	  but	   rather	   to	  maximize	   support	  within	   a	   relatively	  limited	  group	  of	  people).	  The	  strategies	  employed	  by	  candidates	  and	  their	  parties	  are	  also	  not	  entirely	  strategic	  or	  non-­‐strategic.	  For	  example,	  the	  Kōmeitō	  is	  clearly	  a	  strategic	  party:	  it	  runs	  candidates	  only	  when	  it	  assesses	  that	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  win,	  and	  ‘[t]he	  party	  rarely	  overestimates	  its	  strength,	  and	  its	  candidates	  rarely	  lose’	  (Weiner	  2008).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	   JCP	   is	   what	   Weiner	   calls	   ‘the	   prototypical	   sincere	   party’,	   and	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   act	  strategically	  –	   it	  runs	  candidates	  in	  as	  many	  elections	  as	  possible	  even	  when	  there	  is	   little	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  With,	  of	  course,	  the	  assumption	  that	  that	  party	  manifestos	  did	  indeed	  affect	  voter	  choice.	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chance	  of	  winning.	  That	  the	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  seek	  to	  maximize	  their	  support	  and	  reach	  out	  to	  as	  wide	  a	  base	  of	   electorate	  as	  possible	  while	  not	   resorting	   to	  an	   ‘extreme’	  election	   strategy	  means	  that	  their	  manifestos	  should	  reflect	  the	  ‘average’	  election	  strategy	  (G.	  Curtis	  2004).	  	  	  	  
4.4	  THE	  ISSUE	  OF	  PARTY	  	  
Local-­‐central	  relations	   invariably	   lead	  to	  questions	  of	   the	  role	  of	  parties	   in	   local	  elections.	  While	  the	  series	  of	  decentralization	  measures	  as	  mentioned	  above	  increased	  the	  autonomy	  and	  power	  that	  local	  governments	  have	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  center	  and	  increased	  the	  importance	  of	  manifestos	   in	   local	   elections,	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   relations	   within	   parties	   in	   the	   central	  government	  and	   in	   local	  party	  branches	  are	  affected,	   if	  at	  all.	  As	  explained	  previously,	   the	  1994	   electoral	   reforms	   changed	   the	   election	   rules	   for	   parties	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   but	  elections	  at	   the	   local	   level	  were	  not	  directly	  affected,	  which	  meant	   that	   local	  elections	  are	  still	  carried	  out	  in	  multi-­‐member	  districts	  (MMD).	  Past	  (national	  and	  local)	  elections	  under	  the	   MMD	   system	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   local	   characteristics	   and	   personalistic	  politics	   largely	   determined	   the	   election	   winners	   while	   party	   platforms	   took	   a	   back	   seat.	  While	  the	  1994	  electoral	  reforms	  changed	  this	  situation	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  were	  not	  changed	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  There	  are	  two	  conflicting	  forces	  here:	  although	  the	  rules	   for	   local	   elections	   themselves	   did	   not	   change	   and	   therefore	   provided	   no	   direct	  impetus	  for	  local	  politicians	  to	  change	  their	  behavior,	  ties	  between	  Lower	  House	  politicians	  and	  local	  prefectural	  assembly	  members,	  and	  the	  political	  affiliations	  of	  local	  politicians	  to	  their	  parties	  were	   affected.	  This	   saw	   the	   increased	  emphasis	   on	  party	  manifestos	   in	   local	  election	  mirror	  the	  increase	  in	  importance	  of	  manifestos	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  There	   have	   been	   very	   few	   studies	   studying	   the	   importance	   of	   party	   affiliation	   in	  prefectural	   assembly	   elections.	   Analysis	   of	   a	   working	   data	   set	   (Kay	   Shimizu,	   Multi-­‐level	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Elections	  Data	  on	  Japan:	  1995	  –	  2012)	  suggests	  that	  party	  affiliation	  does	  matter	  somewhat	  in	   the	  electoral	  outcomes.	  Using	  data	   from	  the	  same	  set	  of	  prefectures	  as	  was	  used	   in	   the	  analysis	   of	   the	   manifestos	   (explained	   in	   Section	   5),	   candidates	   from	   the	   LDP	   and	   DPJ	  together	  accounted	  for	  55.9%	  of	  all	  candidates	  who	  ran	  for	  elections,	  but	  constituted	  67.8%	  of	  all	  those	  who	  won	  the	  elections.	  Similarly,	  for	  the	  2003	  elections,	  46.4%	  of	  all	  candidates	  were	  from	  either	  the	  LDP	  or	  the	  DPJ,	  while	  67.8%	  of	  those	  who	  won	  were	  from	  these	  two	  parties.	  In	  both	  the	  2011	  and	  2003	  elections,	  the	  proportion	  of	  candidates	  from	  the	  LDP	  or	  DPJ	  who	  won	  elections	  was	  greater	  than	  the	  proportion	  of	  those	  who	  ran.	  This	  suggests,	  but	  does	  not	  prove,	  that	  party	  affiliation	  is	  positively	  correlated	  to	  success	  of	  getting	  elected.	  At	  the	   very	   least,	   party	   affiliation	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   lead	   to	   lower	   chances	   of	   success.	  Conversely,	   33.2%	   and	   24.1%	   of	   candidates	   who	   ran	   in	   the	   2011	   and	   2003	   elections	  respectively	   were	   not	   affiliated	   with	   any	   particular	   party,	   and	   those	   who	   won	   made	   up	  24.6%	  and	  16.2%	  of	  all	  candidates	  respectively.	  In	  prefectural	  assembly	  elections,	  not	  being	  affiliated	  with	  any	  party	  seemed	  to	  be	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  chances	  of	  winning	  a	  seat.	  Breaking	  down	  the	  data	   into	  party-­‐specific	  statistics	  yields	  a	  similar	  picture.	   In	  2011,	  35.1%	  and	  20.7%	  of	  all	  candidates	  who	  ran	  were	  from	  the	  LDP	  and	  the	  DPJ,	  who	  then	  made	  up	  47.7%	  and	  20.1%	  of	  those	  who	  won	  respectively.	  In	  2003,	  the	  corresponding	  figures	  for	  those	  who	  ran	  were	  37.4%	  and	  9.1%,	  and	  48.9%	  and	  10.1%	  of	  those	  who	  won	  were	  from	  the	   LDP	   and	   the	   DPJ	   respectively.	   This	   suggested	   that	   being	   an	   LDP	   candidate	   was	  consistently	   beneficial,	   while	   being	   a	   DPJ	   candidate	   yielded	   slightly	  more	   ambivalent	   but	  still	  generally	  positive	  benefits.	  More	   tellingly,	  however,	   is	   a	   survey	  by	  The	  Association	   for	  Promoting	  Fair	  Elections.	  The	   percentage	   of	   voters	  who	   paid	   greater	   attention	   to	   party	   affiliation	   in	   local	   elections	  increased	  from	  18.3%	  in	  1995	  to	  37%	  in	  2011,	  while	  the	  percentage	  of	  voters	  who	  placed	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  personal	  attributes	  decreased	  from	  a	  peak	  of	  70.7%	  in	  1995	  to	  49.5%	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in	   2011.	   2011	  marked	   the	   first	   time	   the	   percentage	   of	   those	  who	   looked	   to	   personalistic	  characteristics	  to	  decide	  who	  they	  supported	  fell	  below	  50%.	  The	  1995	  local	  elections	  was	  the	   first	  elections	   that	  was	  held	  after	   the	  1994	  reforms,	  and	  was	   the	  start	  of	   this	   trend	  of	  steady	   decrease	   of	   percentage	   of	   those	   who	   based	   their	   decisions	   on	   personal	  characteristics	   of	   candidates	   and	   the	   accompanying	   increase	   of	   those	   who	   pay	   greater	  attention	   to	   party	   affiliation	   of	   candidates	   (The	   Association	   for	   Promoting	   Fair	   Elections	  2012).	  Although	  the	  percentage	  of	  those	  who	  paid	  closer	  attention	  to	  personal	  attributes	  is	  still	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  those	  who	  pay	  attention	  to	  party	  affiliation,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  trend	  of	  convergence,	   if	   not	   reversal.	   Party	   identity	   is	   becoming	   increasingly	   important	   in	   local	  elections,	  and	  is	  evidence	  that	  electoral	  changes	  at	  the	  national	  level	  resound	  down	  to	  local	  elections	  as	  well.	  	  	  
4.5	  THEMES	  OF	  POLICY	  PROPOSALS	  IN	  PARTY	  MANIFESTOS	  	  
In	   this	   paper,	   complex	   text	   analysis	   programs	   and	   tools	   to	   analyze	   the	   contents	   of	   party	  manifestos	   are	   not	   utilized.	   Rather,	   a	   simple	   tally	   of	   specific	   themes	   in	   manifestos	   (eg.	  education,	  infrastructural	  spending,	  administrative	  reform	  etc.)	  across	  the	  47	  prefectures	  is	  taken.	   This	  methodology	   is	   chosen	   primarily	   because	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   perception	   people	  have	  of	  party	  manifestos	  on	  the	  way	  parties	  construct	  their	  manifestos	  is	  the	  main	  variable	  of	   interest	   here.	   I	   argue	   in	   this	   paper	   that	   relations	   between	   local	   governments	   and	   the	  center	   influence	   the	   way	   in	   which	   party	   manifestos	   are	   constructed.	   Whilst	   the	   actual	  content,	  or	  more	  specifically,	   the	  proportion	  dedicated	  to	  specific	  policy	  areas	  or	  different	  issues	  in	  party	  manifestos	  is	  most	  certainly	  relevant	  to	  this	  analysis,	  here	  I	  wish	  to	  focus	  on	  assessing	  the	  salience	  of	  inter-­‐governmental	  relations	  in	  relation	  to	  people’s	  perspectives	  of	  manifestos.	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Most	   voters	   are	   unlikely	   to	   read	   through	   the	   entire	  manifestos	   or	   spend	   substantial	  time	  dissecting	  their	  contents,	  but	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  note	  of	  the	  main	  issues	  and	  give	  a	  cursory	  glance	   through	   the	  details.	  Rölle	   (2002)	   shows	   that	   the	  people	  do	  not	  know	  a	   lot	  about	   party	   manifestos,	   while	   Bara	   (2005)	   finds	   that	   while	   few	   voters	   actually	   read	   the	  manifestos	  produced	  by	  parties,	  manifestos	  are	  used	  as	  materials	   in	  media	  reports	  during	  campaigns.	  Following	  thus,	   for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	   it	  would	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  examine	  the	  categories	  of	  policies	  proposed	  rather	  than	  the	  details	  of	  manifestos.	  	  Manifestos	   are	   therefore	   analyzed	   by	   classification	   of	   policies	   into	   major	   areas	   of	  concern	  such	  as	  ‘education’	  or	  ‘administrative	  reform’.	  The	  particular	  circumstance	  of	  each	  locality	   also	   makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   compare	   details	   of	   proposals	   across	   prefectures.	   More	  importantly,	   the	  focus	  here	   is	   to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations	   in	  determining	  contents	   of	   manifestos	   to	   explain	   why	   have	   bolder	   and	  more	   effectual	   policies	   not	   been	  implemented	  in	  response	  to	  cries	  for	  change	  from	  the	  people.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  differences	  between	  policies	  proposed	  amongst	   localities,	  here	  I	  seek	  to	  show	  the	  absence	  of	   the	   real	   change	   demanded	   by	   the	   people	   as	   observed	   by	   citizens	   through	   party	  manifestos.	  What	   is	   important	   here	   is	   how	   the	   people	   perceive	   the	  manifestos.	   If	   parties	  were	  intent	  on	  effecting	  the	  real	  change	  that	  is	  demanded	  by	  the	  people,	  it	  would	  be	  in	  their	  interest	  to	  indicate	  so	  prominently	  in	  their	  manifestos	  to	  appeal	  to	  voters.	  Conversely,	  the	  conspicuous	  perceived	  absence	  of	  such	  policies	  partially	  reflects	  the	  consciousness	  by	  local	  parties	   of	   the	   various	   constraints	   facing	   local	   governments	   in	   administration	   and	  governance	  of	  the	  different	  localities.	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5. RESULTS	  OF	  MANIFESTO	  ANALYSIS	  
5.1	  ACCESSIBILITY	  AND	  AVAILABILITY	  OF	  MANIFESTOS	  
The	  degree	  at	  which	  local	  manifestos	  were	  readily	  found	  on	  the	  internet	  –	  mainly	  through	  the	  websites	  of	  local	  parties	  in	  each	  prefecture	  –	  differed	  greatly.	  While	  the	  LDP	  had	  a	  page	  on	  its	  main	  party	  website	  that	  provided	  links	  to	  each	  local	  manifesto	  in	  all	  the	  prefectures,	  finding	   local	  manifestos	   by	   the	  DPJ	  was	   a	   lot	  more	   difficult.	   There	  was	   no	   compilation	   of	  local	  manifestos	  on	   the	  party’s	  main	  website.	   In	  most	   cases,	   the	  DPJ’s	   local	  political	  party	  organization	   also	   did	   not	   feature	   local	   manifestos	   prominently	   on	   their	   websites,	   and	   in	  many	  cases,	   local	  manifestos	  were	  not	   found	  at	  all.	  Out	  of	  the	  23	  prefectures	  surveyed	  for	  both	  the	  LDP	  and	  the	  DPJ,	  while	  LDP	  local	  manifestos	  could	  be	  found	  for	  all	  the	  prefectures,	  only	   5	   local	   manifestos	   from	   the	   DPJ	   were	   found.	   Out	   of	   the	   5	   manifestos,	   one	   was	   an	  outdated	   2007	   version	   of	   local	   manifesto.	   Instead	   of	   local	   manifestos,	   the	   prefectures	   of	  Iwate,	   Yamanashi	   and	   Ibaragi	   directed	   users	   to	   the	   general	   party	   manifesto	   in	   the	   main	  party	  website,	  which	  was	  also	  the	  one	  used	  in	  national	  level	  elections.	  	  The	  difficulty	  in	  finding	  local	  manifestos	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  manifestos	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  prefectures	  suggested	   that	  manifestos	  did	  not	   feature	  as	  an	   important	  part	   in	   the	  DPJ’s	  election	   strategy	   at	   the	   local	   level	   in	   2011.	   In	   Iwate,	   for	   instance,	   the	   first	   DPJ	  manifesto	  committee	  meeting	  commenced	  on	  September	  29,	  2011,	  after	  the	  2011	  local	  elections	  were	  held,	   and	   is	   evidence	   that	   the	   local	  party	  did	  not	   rely	  on	   local	  party	  manifestos	   to	   attract	  voters.	  Even	   if	   local	  manifestos	  were	  developed,	   the	   lack	  of	  attention	  paid	   to	   them	  by	   the	  DPJ	  was	  glaring.	  The	  DPJ	  party	  organization	  in	  Aomori,	  for	  example,	  had	  several	  links	  to	  its	  2011	  local	  manifesto	  on	  its	  website,	  but	  all	  the	  links	  were	  broken.	  Some	  prefectures	  did	  not	  have	  local	  manifestos	  even	  for	  the	  2011	  elections,	  despite	  local	  manifestos	  first	  surfacing	  in	  2003	  (McElwain	  and	  Reed	  2009;	  Kamata	  2004).	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In	   contrast,	   the	   LDP	   paid	  much	   attention	   to	   the	   local	  manifestos	   of	   their	   local	   party	  organizations.	  There	  were	  a	  few	  standardized	  layouts	  that	  applied	  to	  all	  manifestos,	  and	  the	  main	   principles	   of	   policies	   and	   objectives	   in	   different	   prefectures	  were	   highly	   congruent.	  This,	   however,	   does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	  policies	  proposed	  were	   stylized	   and	  did	  not	  differ	  among	   prefectures.	   Although	   many	   policies	   proposed	   were	   highly	   similar	   across	  prefectures,	   there	   was	   also	   a	   surprisingly	   large	   degree	   of	   variation	   between	   the	   mix	   of	  policies	  proposed,	  especially	  for	  locality-­‐specific	  policies.	  	  
5.2	  CLASSIFICATION	  OF	  POLICY	  PROPOSALS	  IN	  MANIFESTOS	  
Policies	  proposed	  in	  manifestos	  are	  firstly	  classified	  into	  policy	  categories	  depending	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  proposals.	  Policy	  categories	  are	  then	  further	  classified	  into	  broad	  groupings	  –	  what	   I	   term	   ‘policy	   types’	   –	   in	   view	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   central	   and	   local	  governments,	   such	   that	   policy	   types	   reflect	   whether	   the	   specific	   policies	   proposed	   are	  particular	  to	  a	  prefecture	  or	  common	  across	  Japan,	  or	  whether	  it	  depends	  on	  fiscal	  handouts	  or	  subsidies	   from	  the	  central	  government.	   In	  addition,	  policy	  categories	  are	  also	  classified	  into	   ‘policy	   groups’	   that	   reflect	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  policies	  –	  whether	   they	  are	   economic	   in	  nature,	  or	  whether	  they	  concern	  the	  welfare	  of	  residents,	  for	  example.	  	  An	  example	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  ‘policy	  categories’,	  ‘policy	  types’	  and	  ‘policy	  groups’	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  table	  below:	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Specific	  policy	   Policy	  Category	   Policy	  Type	   Policy	  Group	  Build	  more	  retraining	  centers	  to	  equip	  workers	  with	  relevant	  and	  necessary	  skills	  	   Boost	  employment	   2	  –	  Common	  across	  prefectures	   Economy	  
Increase	  support	  (administrative	  and	  financial)	  for	  local	  businesses	   Economic	  revitalization	  Increase	  export	  of	  local	  agricultural	  produce	  	   Support	  local	  agricultural	  industries	   3	  –	  Local	  specific	  Import	  of	  advanced	  farming	  methods	  and	  technologies	  to	  improve	  efficiency	  of	  farming	  activities	  Increase	  transparency	  of	  local	  government	  procedures	   Administrative	  reform	   Administrative	  reform	  Increase	  medical	  facilities	  and	  services	  catering	  to	  infants	  and	  young	  children	   Childcare	   2	  –	  Common	  across	  prefectures	   Welfare	  
Table	  5.1:	  Relationship	  between	  specific	  policies,	  policy	  categories,	  policy	  groups	  and	  policy	  
types	  	  The	   differentiation	   of	   policy	   categories	   into	   policy	   groups	   and	   policy	   types	   allows	   for	  analysis	  with	  different	  emphasis	   to	  be	  applied	   to	   the	  policies	  proposed.	  While	  each	  policy	  category	  must	  belong	  to	  a	  policy	  type,	  policy	  groups	  are	  constructed	  mainly	  for	  the	  policies	  that	  are	  of	  particular	  interest,	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  cover	  all	  policy	  categories	  (for	  example,	  the	  policy	  category	  of	  ‘greater	  protection	  against	  earthquakes,	  tsunami	  and	  other	  disasters’	  does	  not	  fall	  into	  any	  particular	  policy	  group).	  	  Policy	  categories,	  types	  and	  groups	  are	  further	  elaborated	  on	  below.	  	   (I) POLICY	  CATEGORIES	  Proposals	   in	   local	   manifestos	   were	   classified	   in	   to	   several	   categories	   depending	   on	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   policies.	   For	   example,	   proposals	   dealing	  with	   elementary	   education	   or	   high	  school	   educational	   standards	  were	   classified	   under	   ‘boosting	   education’,	  while	   those	   that	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advocated	  training	  more	  nurses	  to	  supplement	  understaffed	   local	  hospitals	  and	  those	  that	  proposed	   greater	   integration	   between	   medical	   services	   offered	   in	   the	   prefecture	   were	  similarly	  classified	  under	  ‘improving	  medical	  care	  and	  increasing	  personnel’.	  	  	  The	  table	  below	  presents	  the	  classifications	  of	  policies	  found	  in	  LDP	  local	  manifestos	  of	  23	  prefectures:	  	  
Policy	  Categories	   LDP	   DPJ	  Frequency	   %	   Frequency	   %	  Economic	  revitalization	  	   17	   8.67	   3	   5.45	  Improvement	  of	  medical	  care	  and	  increase	  in	  personnel	   16	   8.16	   2	   3.64	  Support	  local	  agriculture	  industries	   16	   8.16	   2	   1.82	  Boost	  education	  standards	   14	   7.14	   5	   9.09	  Boost	  employment	   14	   7.14	   4	   7.27	  Childcare	   14	   7.14	   4	   7.27	  Boost	  local	  tourism	   12	   6.12	   0	   0.00	  Environmental	  protection	   11	   5.61	   4	   7.27	  Development	  of	  internal	  transport	  network	  (within	  the	  prefecture)	   10	   5.10	   0	   0.00	  Administrative	  reform	   8	   4.08	   6	   10.91	  Boost	  infrastructure	   8	   4.08	   1	   1.82	  Old	  age	  care	   8	   4.08	   3	   5.45	  Safety	   7	   3.57	   3	   5.45	  Development	  of	  external	  transport	  network	  (to	  develop	  the	  prefecture	  as	  a	  transport	  hub)	   5	   2.55	   1	   1.82	  Greater	  protection	  against	  earthquakes,	  tsunami	  and	  other	  disasters	   5	   2.55	   3	   5.45	  Revitalize	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	   4	   2.04	   0	   0.00	  Dam	  construction	  /	  completion	   3	   1.53	   1	   1.82	  Helping	  SMEs	   3	   1.53	   2	   3.64	  Increase	  in	  cultural	  awareness	  and	  resident	  involvement	  in	  community	  activities	   3	   1.53	   2	   3.64	  More	  comprehensive	  welfare	  and	  social	  safety	  net	   3	   1.53	   4	   7.27	  Conveying	  the	  voices	  of	  residents	  to	  local	  Lower	  House	  politicians	   2	   1.02	   0	   0.00	  Energy	   2	   1.02	   1	   1.82	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  (TPP)	   2	   1.02	   0	   0.00	  Miscellaneous	  Policies	   9	   4.59	   4	   7.27	  
Table	  5.2:	  Policy	  categories	  and	  their	  frequency	  of	  appearance	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(II) POLICY	  TYPES	  Each	   of	   these	   categories	   were	   also	   classified	   under	   5	   broader	   types:	   1	   –	   public	   works	  projects	   and	   policies	   that	   require	   substantial	   government	   spending,	   such	   as	   the	  construction	   of	   highways	   and	   investment	   in	   infrastructure;	   2	   –	   policies	   that	   are	   common	  across	  prefectures,	  such	  as	  boosting	  employment	  and	  stimulating	  the	  economy;	  3	  –	  policies	  that	  are	  particular	  to	  specific	  prefectures,	  such	  as	  supporting	  local	  agricultural	  communities	  or	  boosting	  local	  tourism;	  4	  –	  policies	  that	  are	  party-­‐specific	  or	  which	  concern	  controversial	  issues	   on	  which	   the	   LDP	   and	   the	   DPJ	   are	   split	   on	   their	   stances	   such	   as	   the	   Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  (TPP)	  or	  construction	  of	  dams	  in	  certain	  prefectures;	  5	  –	  miscellaneous	  policies	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  any	  of	  the	  previous	  categories,	  such	  as	  a	  proposal	  by	  the	  LDP	  in	  Shizouka	  to	  forge	  distinct	  identities	  for	  municipals	  to	  foster	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging	  in	  residents.	  	  A	  policy	  category	  may	  contain	  policies	   in	  overlapping	  policy	   types,	  depending	  on	   the	  specific	   policies	   in	   question.	   For	   instance,	   under	   the	   category	   ‘development	   of	   external	  transport	  network’,	   Fukui	  prefecture’s	  proposal	   to	  develop	   its	  port	   into	  a	  hub	   to	   increase	  exchanges	  and	  establish	  commercial	  ties	  with	  other	  ports	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  policy	  specific	  to	  Fukui	  prefecture,	  but	  Hokkaido’s	  proposal	  to	  construct	  a	  local	  airport	  to	  better	  service	  its	  residents	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  public	  works	  project.	  	  The	  5	  policy	  types	  and	  the	  number	  of	  policies	  in	  each	  type	  are	  illustrated	  in	  the	  table	  below:	  
Policy	  
Type	  
Description	   LDP	   DPJ	  
Frequency	   %	   Frequency	   %	  1	   Public	  works	  project	   16	   8.16	   1	   1.82	  2	   Policies	  common	  across	  prefectures	   88	   44.90	   22	   40.00	  3	   Policies	  specific	  to	  particular	  localities	   81	   41.33	   29	   52.73	  4	   Party-­‐specific	  policies	  	   6	   3.06	   2	   3.64	  5	   Miscellaneous	  policies	   5	   2.55	   1	   1.82	  
Table	  5.3:	  Policy	  types	  and	  their	  frequency	  of	  appearance	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(III) POLICY	  GROUPS	  Another	   way	   of	   analyzing	   the	   policies	   in	   manifestos	   is	   to	   classify	   them	   according	   to	   the	  nature	   of	   the	  policies	   into	  what	   I	   call	   policy	   groups.	   This	   classification	   into	   policy	   groups	  facilitated	   easier	   analysis	   of	   the	   types	   of	   policies	   that	   were	   proposed	   in	   manifestos.	   For	  example,	   while	   policies	   proposing	   for	   more	   childcare	   facilities	   to	   be	   built	   and	   for	   more	  comprehensive	  healthcare	   services	   for	   the	  elderly	  are	   classified	  under	   ‘childcare’	   and	   ‘old	  age	   care’	   respectively,	   both	   policies	   are	   also	   considered	   policies	   aimed	   at	   improving	   the	  welfare	   of	   the	   people.	   As	   such,	   certain	   policy	   categories	   fall	   entirely	   under	   certain	   policy	  groups,	  while	  others	  fall	  into	  different	  policy	  groups.	  Policy	  categories	  that	  do	  not	  share	  any	  common	  characteristics	  with	  other	  categories,	  are	  particular	  to	  certain	  prefectures,	  or	  are	  of	  particular	   interest	   in	   this	   paper,	   are	   not	   further	   classified	   into	   policy	   groups,	   but	   are	  analyzed	  by	  policy	  categories.	  In	  addition,	  policy	  groups	  may	  overlap	  and	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	   For	   instance,	   ‘economic	   activities	   (local)’	   is	   a	   subset	   of	   ‘economic	   activities	  (locally	  and	  across	  Japan)’	  (see	  below).	  	  The	  policy	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  times	  they	  are	  featured	  are	  shown	  below:	  
Policy	  Group	   LDP	   DPJ	  
Frequency	   %	   Frequency	   %	  Economic	  activities	  (local	  and	  across	  Japan)	   66	   33.67	   10	   18.18	  Economic	  activities	  (local)	   35	   17.86	   3	   7.27	  Welfare	   40	   20.41	   13	   23.64	  Standard	  of	  living	   52	   26.53	   15	   27.27	  Administrative	  reform	   8	   4.08	   6	   10.90	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  (TPP)-­‐related	  policies	   2	   1.02	   0	   0.00	  Controversial	  policies	   21	   10.7	   8	   14.5	  
Table	  5.4:	  Policy	  groups	  and	  the	  number	  of	  policies	  under	  each	  group	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5.3	  EXPLAINING	  THE	  RESULTS	  
The	  policies	  proposed	  in	  each	  party’s	  manifesto	  show	  an	  interesting	  pattern	  of	  distribution.	  From	   Table	   5.3,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   percentage	   of	   policies	   in	   both	   parties	   that	   bring	   about	  changes	   to	   areas	   that	   require	   improvements	   and	   that	   are	   common	   throughout	   Japan	   is	  roughly	   equal	   at	   44.90%	   for	   the	   LDP	   and	   40.00%	   for	   the	   DPJ.	   This	   reflects	   a	   common	  recognition	   across	   local	   parties	   across	   Japan	   of	   the	   areas	   that	   require	   change	   and	   that	  greater	   effort	   is	   needed	   to	   tackle	   several	   common	   issues	   faced	   nationwide.	   These	   are	  primarily	  welfare	  issues	  such	  as	  childcare,	  old	  age	  care,	  improving	  healthcare	  facilities	  and	  training	  more	  medical	  personnel,	  augmenting	  the	  welfare	  system	  and	  improving	  the	  social	  safety	   net	   system,	   increasing	   educational	   standards	   in	   schools,	   revitalizing	   the	   economy,	  and	  boosting	  employment.	  The	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  exhibit	  a	  high	  degree	  of	   similarity	   in	  specific	  policy	   categories	   such	   as	   childcare	   (7.14%	   for	   the	   LDP,	   7.27%	   for	   the	   DPJ),	   old	   age	   care	  (4.08%	  for	   the	  LDP,	  5.45%	  for	   the	  DPJ),	  boosting	  employment	  (7.14%	  for	   the	  LDP,	  7.27%	  for	  the	  DPJ)	  etc.	  These	  policy	  areas	  tackle	  problems	  that	  are	  found	  all	  over	  Japan,	  and	  while	  the	   specifics	   and	   modes	   of	   implementation	   of	   policies	   aimed	   at	   tackling	   these	   problems	  differ	  accordingly	  with	  the	  varying	  circumstances	  in	  different	   localities,	   the	  nature	  of	  such	  policies	  are	  essentially	  highly	  similar.	  	  Table	   5.4	   also	   illustrates	   this	   trend.	   Approximately	   20%	   of	   the	   LDP’s	   manifesto	  contains	  policy	   issues	   that	  concern	   the	  welfare	  of	   citizens,	  while	   the	  corresponding	   figure	  for	  the	  DPJ	  is	  24%.	  Similarly,	  policies	  that	  are	  aimed	  at	  improving	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  of	  residents	   take	   up	   roughly	   27%	   of	   both	   the	   LDP’s	   and	   DPJ’s	   manifestos.	   Table	   5.3	   also	  indicates	  that	  the	  number	  of	  policies	  dedicated	  to	  party-­‐specific	  policies	  is	  roughly	  equal	  for	  both	  the	  LDP	  (3.06%)	  and	  the	  DPJ	  (3.64%).	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The	  main	   differences	   in	   policies	   proposed,	   therefore,	   concern	   public	   works	   projects	  and	   policies	   that	   are	   specific	   to	   particular	   localities.	   8.16%	   of	   the	   LDP’s	   policies	   are	  concerned	  with	  some	  form	  of	  public	  works	  projects	  or	  another,	  as	  compared	  to	  1.82%	  of	  the	  DPJ’s	   policies.	   Conversely,	   the	   DPJ	   has	   a	   larger	   percentage	   of	   policies	   that	   are	   specific	   to	  various	  localities	  at	  52.73%,	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  LDP’s	  41.33%.	  	  	  Specific	   policy	   categories,	   types	   or	   groups	   that	   are	   of	   particular	   interest	   are	   further	  examined	  below:	  	  
	  
5.3.1	  Supporting	  Local	  Agriculture	  Industries,	  Boosting	  Infrastructures	  and	  Developing	  Local	  
Transportation	  Networks	  The	   LDP	   has	   a	   much	   higher	   percentage	   of	   policies	   dedicated	   to	   certain	   policies	   such	   as	  supporting	  local	  agricultural	  industries	  and	  communities	  and	  boosting	  public	  infrastructure	  such	   as	   construction	   of	   roads,	   highways	   etc.	   than	   the	   DPJ	   (Table	   5.2).	   These	   reflect	   the	  pattern	  of	  politics	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  where	  the	  basis	  for	  support	  for	  LDP’s	  continued	  rule	  for	  over	  50	  years	  has	  traditionally	  been	  rural	  constituents	  whom	  the	  LDP	  has	  kept	  satisfied	  by	   lavishing	   generous	   amounts	   of	   pork-­‐barrel	   spending	   to	   build	   local	   amenities	   and	  infrastructure	   (Curtis	   1999).	  These	   is	   observed	  here	   as	  well,	  where	  public	  works	  policies	  and	  policies	  directed	  at	  upgrading	  or	  extending	  local	  transport	  networks	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	  LDP	  (4.08%	  and	  5.10%	  respectively)	   is	  significantly	  higher	  than	  that	  proposed	  by	  the	  DPJ	  (1.82%	   and	   0.00%	   respectively).	   The	   LDP	   maintains	   its	   strong	   support	   base	   in	   rural	  communities	  by	   supporting	   the	  agricultural	   communities	  and	   industries,	   and	   it	   signals	   its	  intention	  to	  continue	  doing	  so	  by	  dedicating	  8.16%	  of	  its	  manifesto	  policies	  to	  the	  support	  of	  agricultural	   industries,	  as	  opposed	   to	   the	  DPJ’s	  1.82%.	  While	  electoral	  bases	  have	  been	  changing	  over	  the	  years	  (such	  as	  an	  erosion	  of	  support	  for	  the	  LDP	  over	  the	  years	  due	  to	  the	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cut	   back	   in	   pork-­‐barrel	   spending	   as	   mentioned	   previously),	   patterns	   of	   policies	   in	  manifestos	   are	   unable	   to	   capture	   this	   shift	   in	   voter	   support	   over	   time.	   Patterns	   of	  comparative	  advantage	  remain	  unchanged	  –	  ie.	  rural	  constituencies	  still	  primarily	  support	  the	  LDP	  more	   than	  any	  other	  party,	   and	   these	   	   are	   reflected	   in	   the	  patterns	  of	  policies	   in	  manifestos.	  	  
5.3.2	  The	  Changing	  Needs	  of	  Society	  2.04%	  of	   the	   LDP	   local	  manifestos	   are	   concerned	  with	   showing	   greater	   support	   for	   local	  manufacturing	   firms.	   Although	   this	   is	   a	   small	   number,	   it	   is	   contrasted	  with	   0.00%	   of	   the	  DPJ’s	   policies	   that	   are	   aimed	   at	   revitalizing	   the	   manufacturing	   industry	   in	   Japan’s	  prefectures.	   Although	   renowned	   for	   its	   high	   quality	  manufacturing	   and	   advanced	   level	   of	  technology	   involved	   in	  manufacturing	  processes,	  manufacturing	   in	   Japan	   is	   losing	   its	  edge	  to	  its	  Asian	  counterparts	  in	  lower-­‐quality	  and	  less	  technologically	  advanced	  products	  such	  as	   electronics	   or	   consumer	   products.	   While	   there	   has	   been	   increasing	   recognition	   that	  restructuring	   of	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   away	   from	   products	   that	   require	   a	   lower	   level	   of	  technological	   requirement	   to	   products	   that	   require	   high	   technological	   requirements	   is	  necessary	  (METI	  2012),	  workers	  in	  industries	  that	  are	  facing	  fierce	  competition	  from	  other	  Asian	   countries	   are	   obviously	   against	   this	   shift	   in	   economic	   structure.	   That	   the	   LDP	   pays	  attention	   to	   reviving	   local	   manufacturing	   that	   are	   threatened	   by	   economic	   restructuring	  and	  international	  trade	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  some	  (although	  not	  seemingly	  overwhelming)	  reluctance	  to	  restructure	  the	  economy	  to	  better	  reflect	  Japan’s	  comparative	  advantage.	  In	   contrast,	   only	   1.53%	   of	   the	   LDP’s	   policies	   in	   local	   manifestos	   concern	   building	   a	  more	  comprehensive	  welfare	  and	  social	  safety	  net,	  as	  compared	  to	   the	  DPJ’s	  7.27%.	  Here,	  ‘building	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  welfare	  and	  social	  safety	  net’	  refers	  to	  policies	  that	  target	  increasing	   employment	   and	   everyday	   support	   for	   the	   disabled,	   helping	   the	   unemployed	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retrain	   and	   seek	   reemployment,	   greater	   protection	   for	   abused	   children	   and	   care	   for	  delinquent	  youth	  etc.	  While	  Japan’s	  ‘welfare	  for	  work’	  system	  was	  able	  to	  cater	  to	  all	  when	  economic	   growth	  was	   high	   and	   there	  was	   enough	   to	   go	   around,	   the	   economic	   slowdown	  beginning	   in	   the	  early	  1990s	   left	   ‘non-­‐regular’	  workers	   (ie.	   part-­‐time,	   temporary	  workers	  etc.)	  and	  female	  employees	  facing	  worsening	  employment	  conditions	  without	  an	  adequate	  social	  safety	  net	  to	  catch	  those	  who	  are	  hurt	  by	  the	  economic	  stagnation	  (Miura	  2012).	  The	  LDP	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  pay	  much	  attention	  to	  these	  marginalized	  members	  of	  society,	  while	  the	  DPJ	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  attentive	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  these	  politically	  ‘less	  powerful’	  groups.	  	  
5.3.3	  Administrative	  Reform	  	  One	   locality-­‐specific	  policy	  of	  particular	   interest	   is	   that	  of	   administrative	   reform.4	  Besides	  goals	   such	   as	   a	   more	   transparent	   government,	   cleaner	   politics,	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	  voices	   of	   residents,	   one	   of	   the	   main	   aims	   of	   administrative	   reforms	   is	   greater	   local	  administrative	  and	   fiscal	  autonomy	  (Wright	  and	  Sakurai	  1987).	  This	   involves	   revising	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments.	  	  Looking	   across	   all	   policy	   categories,	   administrative	   reforms	  make	   up	   10.90%	   of	   the	  total	  number	  of	  policies	  proposed	  by	  the	  DPJ,	  but	  only	  4.08%	  of	  that	  of	  the	  LDP	  (Table	  5.4).	  Almost	  every	  local	  DPJ	  manifesto	  surveyed	  included	  a	  promise	  to	  carry	  out	  administrative	  reforms,	   while	   the	   2011	   manifesto	   for	   the	   Gunma	   prefecture	   even	   included	   a	   pledge	   to	  reform	  not	  only	   the	  administrative	  structure	  of	   the	  government,	  but	   that	  of	   the	  DPJ	  party	  itself.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Here,	   I	   consider	   administrative	   reforms	   to	   be	   locality-­‐specific	   policies,	   as	   the	   varying	  nature	   and	   characteristics	   of	   prefectural	   governments	  mean	   that	   the	   scope	   and	  nature	   of	  administrative	  reforms	  differ	  accordingly.	  
42	  	  
The	   question	   here	   then	   is,	   under	   this	   hypothesis,	   given	   that	   it	   is	   the	   DPJ	   that	   is	   in	  power	   in	   the	   central	   government	   from	   2009	   to	   2012,	  why	   do	   local	   LDP	   politicians	   seem	  more	  constrained	  than	  local	  DPJ	  politicians?	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  traditional	  lines	  of	  cooperation	  and	  alliances	  between	  LDP	  politicians	  and	  bureaucrats	  and	  the	  partial	  success	  of	   the	   DPJ	   in	   reconfiguring	   this	   relation.	   One	   of	   the	   stated	   objectives	   of	   the	   DPJ	   was	   to	  restructure	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  bureaucrats	  and	  politicians	  and	  limit	  the	  power	  bureaucrats	  have	  over	  legislation	  and	  state	  resources.	  After	  coming	  to	  power,	  although	  the	  DPJ	   managed	   to	   break	   down	   past	   patterns	   of	   cooperation	   between	   the	   LDP	   and	   the	  bureaucracy	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success,	   they	  had	  been	   less	  successful	   in	  building	  up	  their	   own	   alliances	   and	   establishing	   new	   frameworks	   to	   institutionalize	   politicians’	   rule	  over	  the	  bureaucracy.	  Elimination	  of	  meetings	  between	  politicians	  and	  administrative	  vice-­‐ministers	  and	  having	  politicians	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  designing	  policies	  and	  appointment	  of	  personnel	  within	  ministries	   dismantled	   the	   core	   institutions	   of	   the	  policymaking	  process.	  However,	   these	   measures	   also	   alienated	   many	   bureaucrats	   who	   were	   unhappy	   at	   the	  sudden	   and	  drastic	   reduction	   of	   their	   powers.	  Many	  were	   also	   frustrated	  with	  politicians	  who	  did	  not	  have	  the	  expertise	  nor	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  ‘subtleties	  of	  substantial	  policy	  issues’,	  yet	  demanded	  to	  lead	  the	  process	  of	  policy	  formulation	  (Vogel	  2010).	  	  What	  this	  means	  for	  local	  DPJ	  politicians	  in	  the	  context	  of	  administrative	  reform	  is	  that	  they	   have	   a	   greater	   impetus	   than	   LDP	   politicians	   to	   advocate	   a	   ‘continued’	   reform	   of	   the	  system	  to	  one	  which	  gives	  politicians	  more	  say	  in	  policymaking	  while	  better	  harnessing	  the	  expertise	   of	   bureaucrats	   with	   greater	   cooperation	   between	   the	   two.	   Advocacy	   of	  administrative	  reform	  here	  serves	  two	  purposes:	  firstly,	  proposals	  of	  administrative	  reform	  are	   in	   line	  with	   the	   voters’	   demands,	  which	  would	   earn	   politicians	   the	   support	   of	   voters	  within	   their	   constituencies.	   Secondly,	  DPJ	   politicians	   stand	   to	   gain	   from	   restructuring	   the	  relationships	  between	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  politicians	  into	  one	  more	  in	  line	  with	  their	  ideal	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relationship.	  This	   is	   one	  where	  politicians	  would	   continue	   to	   lead	  policymaking	   and	  have	  control	  over	  bureaucrats,	  but	  with	  greater	  collaboration	  between	  them	  to	  avoid	  repeating	  the	   confusing	   pattern	   of	   policy	   formulation	   and	   implementation	   characteristic	   of	   DPJ	  policymaking	  between	  2009	  and	  2012.	  	  In	  contrast,	  although	  the	  LDP	  was	  not	  in	  power	  in	  the	  central	  government	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	   2011	   elections,	   it	   is	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   local	   and	   national	   level	   LDP	   politicians	   to	  preserve	  the	  lines	  of	  contact	  that	  have	  served	  them	  so	  well	  thus	  far.	  Strong	  ties	  between	  the	  local	   and	   central	   government	  means	   that	   local	   LDP	   politicians	   have	   been	   able	   to	   extract	  benefits	  from	  national	  level	  politicians	  –	  traditionally	  in	  the	  form	  of	  financial	  subsidies	  and	  aids	   for	   public	   work	   projects	   through	   the	   ‘pipeline’	   that	   gives	   local	   politicians	   access	   to	  central	   governments	   funds.	   Although	   local	   politicians	  were	   unable	   to	   utilize	   this	   pipeline	  then	   as	   the	   DPJ	   was	   in	   control	   of	   the	   central	   government,	   there	   nonetheless	   exists	   the	  possibility	   that	   if/when	   the	   LDP	   returns	   to	   power,	   such	   pipelines	   would	   prove	   highly	  beneficial	   for	   local	   LDP	   politicians	   once	   again.	   This	   in	   turn	   incentivizes	   them	   not	   to	  implement	  drastic	   changes	   to	   the	  system.	  At	   the	  very	   least,	   in	  view	  of	   the	  chaotic	   state	  of	  policy	   formulation	   and	   implementation	   then,	   electoral	   strategy	   would	   suggest	   that	   it	   is	  beneficial	  to	  the	  LDP	  if	  the	  DPJ	  policymaking	  and	  implementation	  apparatus	  continued	  to	  be	  in	   disarray.	   It	   would	   therefore	   play	   to	   the	   advantage	   of	   the	   LDP	   local	   politicians	   not	   to	  advocate	  reform	  to	  maintain	  this	  confusion	  as	   long	  as	   it	   is	   the	  DPJ	   in	  power	  in	  the	  central	  government.	  	  Here,	  the	  pattern	  of	  policies	  advocating	  administrative	  reform	  reflects	  the	  local	  parties’	  consideration	   for	   themselves	  and	   for	   the	  party	   at	   the	  national	   level.	  This	   form	  of	   central-­‐local	   relations	   encapsulates	   how	   the	   behavior	   of	   local	   political	   parties	   is	   affected	   by	   the	  behavior	  and	  considerations	  for	  the	  party	  at	  the	  national	  level.	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5.4	  RELATING	  THE	  RESULTS	  TO	  THE	  TYPE	  OF	  CENTRAL-­‐LOCAL	  RELATIONS	  
At	   first	   glance,	   the	   results	   of	   analysis	   of	   the	  manifestos	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   vertical	  administrative	   model	   still	   applies	   to	   the	   central-­‐local	   relations	   today.	   The	   generally	   low	  percentage	   of	   policy	   proposals	   advocating	   ‘real’	   changes	   to	   the	   system	   in	   the	   form	   of	  administrative	   reform	   or	   reform	   of	   party	   politics	   (as	   opposed	   to	   changes	   that	   tweak	   or	  improve	   on	   the	   current	   system	  without	   fundamentally	   changing	   the	   politics	   –	   improving	  childcare,	   for	   example)	   suggest	   an	   alignment	   of	   interests	   of	   local	   politicians	   to	   those	   of	  national-­‐level	  politicians.	  	  This	  is	   likely	  due	  to	  local	  government’s	  fiscal	  dependence	  on	  the	  center	  which	  results	  in	   the	   former	   aligning	   themselves	   with	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   latter.	   Similarly,	   parties	   that	  control	  the	  central	  government	  also	  control	  the	  national	  budget,	  and	  endeavors	  to	  increase	  funding	   to	   local	   governments	   compel	   local	  parties	   to	   adjust	   their	  policies	   in	   line	  with	   the	  preferences	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  control.	  Local	  DPJ	  manifestos,	  therefore,	  reflect	  little	  intent	  to	  change	  the	  administrative	  pattern	  and	  the	  politics	  as	  per	  residents’	  demands.	  Only	  10%	  of	  the	  DPJ	  manifestos	  are	  concerned	  with	  administrative	  reform	  –	  still	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  policies	   proposed.5	  This	   reflects	   more	   ‘benign’	   changes	   that	   are	   unlikely	   to	   diminish	   the	  power	  of	  their	  party	  at	  the	  national	  level	  and	  allows	  them	  to	  continue	  benefitting	  from	  the	  strong	   relationship	   with	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   central	   government.	   Although	   such	  ‘benign’	  proposals	  such	  as	  infrastructural	  spending	  may	  increase	  competition	  between	  local	  governments	  and	  the	  central	  government	  for	  fiscal	  resources,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  these	  do	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Even	  though	  almost	  every	  DPJ	  manifesto	  examined	  proposed	  administrative	  reform,	  such	  proposals	  were	  usually	   restricted	   to	  one	   ‘section’	   each	  –	   ie.	  none	  elaborated	  on	  how	   they	  were	  going	  to	  carry	  out	  administrative	  reform	  in	  detail,	  nor	  did	  any	  local	  DPJ	  party	  dedicate	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  their	  manifesto	  to	  administrative	  reform.	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threaten	   to	   undermine	   the	   way	   politics	   have	   traditionally	   been	   run	   or	   restructure	   the	  relationships	  among	  political	  actors	  in	  the	  government.	  	  The	   pattern	   of	   manifesto	   content	   can	   also	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   inclination	   of	   local	  politicians	   to	   align	   themselves	   along	   party	   policies	   to	   avoid	   antagonizing	   party	   leaders,	  possibly	   to	   maximize	   their	   career	   chances	   of	   being	   selected	   to	   run	   in	   national-­‐level	  elections.	   This	   would	   compel	   them	   not	   to	   propose	   policies	   that	   would	   disrupt	   the	  organization	  of	  the	  party.	  Under	  this	  proposition,	  local	  DPJ	  politicians	  are	  unlikely	  to	  openly	  and	   widely	   propose	   administrative	   reform	   as	   active	   advocacy	   of	   political	   reform	   would	  inconvenience	  the	  party.	  	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  conversely	  mean	  that	  local	  LDP	  politicians	  are	  free	  to	  propose	  whatever	  policies	  they	  feel	  will	  best	  earn	  them	  votes	  (given	  that	  the	  central	  government	  in	  2009	   is	   dominated	   by	   the	   DPJ).	   As	   explained	   above	   (Section	   3.3),	   I	   believe	   that	   this	   is	  because	  LDP	  politicians	  still	  take	  into	  account	  the	  ties	  between	  politicians,	  bureaucrats	  and	  other	  political	  actors	  that	  have	  not	  been	  completely	  broken	  even	  with	  the	  DPJ	  in	  power	  in	  the	  central	  government.	  Although	  they	  were	  not	  bound	  to	   toe	   the	   line	  drawn	  by	  national-­‐level	  DPJ	  politicians,	  local	  LDP	  politicians	  still	  have	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  limitations	  they	  face	  with	  regards	  to	  other	  political	  actors.	  	  In	   summary,	   just	   as	   the	   interdependent	   relationship	   model	   suggests,	   local	  governments	  themselves	  too	  have	  a	  part	  to	  play	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  The	  increase	  in	   political	   resources	   local	   governments	   can	   draw	   from	   and	   the	   dependence	   of	   national-­‐level	  politicians	  on	  local	  politicians	  to	  gather	  votes	  and	  implement	  national	  policies	  means	  that	  local	  governments	  can	  increasingly	  reflect	  the	  demands	  of	  voters	  as	  well	  as	  their	  own	  initiatives.	   As	   local	   governments	   are	   gaining	   an	   increasingly	   louder	   voice	   in	   the	   political	  arena,	   local	  parties	  are	  not	  obligated	   to	   tie	   themselves	  as	   tightly	   to	   the	  preferences	  of	   the	  center.	   While	   local	   DPJ	   politicians	   face	   an	   additional	   constraint	   of	   needing	   to	   cultivate	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favorable	   ties	  with	   the	  national-­‐level	  DPJ	  politicians,	   local	  LDP	  politicians	  do	  not	   face	   this	  additional	   intra-­‐party	   restriction	   and	   therefore	   are	   less	   obligated	   to	   toe	   this	   line.	  Nonetheless,	  local	  LDP	  politicians	  do	  not	  have	  complete	  autonomy	  in	  their	  policy	  proposals	  due	   to	   considerations	   of	   possible	   future	   cooperation.	   This	   explains	   how	   the	   central-­‐local	  relations	   restrain	   parties	   in	   local	   governments	   such	   that	   both	   the	   LDP	   and	   the	   DPJ	   local	  parties	  are	  muted	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  address	  the	  calls	  for	  real	  political	  change	  and	  reform.	  	  	  
5.5	  WHAT	  DOES	  THIS	  MEAN?	  
The	  pattern	  of	  policies	  observed	  shows	  confirms	  that	  local	  parties’	  manifestos	  are	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  policy	  positions	  and	  preferences	  of	  national	  parties.	  Proportion	  of	  policies	  that	   tackle	   issues	   such	   as	   improving	   the	   welfare	   system,	   greater	   provision	   of	   childcare	  services	   etc.	   –	   policies	   that	   tackle	   widely-­‐recognized	   problems	   which	   apply	   to	   large	  segments	  of	   the	  population,	  and	  are	  acknowledged	  by	  both	  parties	  to	  be	  essential	  policies	  that	  must	  be	  implemented	  in	  response	  to	  the	  changing	  needs	  of	  society	  –	  are	  highly	  similar	  across	  parties.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  policies	  that	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  population	  at	  large	  or	  that	  target	  specific	  groups	   that	  have	   traditionally	  been	  support	  bases	   for	  specific	  parties	  differ	  much	  more	  across	  parties.	  These	  include	  policies	  concerning	  agricultural	  communities	  and	  big	  businesses	  –	  who	  traditionally	  are	  constituents	  of	  the	  LDP	  –	  and	  low-­‐wage	  workers	  and	  women	   –	   whose	   needs	   have	   been	   neglected	   under	   the	   old	   system	   –	   whom	   the	   DPJ	   are	  targeting	  to	  win	  their	  votes.	  Moreover,	   the	  pattern	  of	   policies	  pertaining	   to	   administrative	   reform	   illustrates	  how	  local	  politicians’	  policy	  preferences	  reflect	  the	  positions	  of	  their	  parties	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  local	  political	  parties	  do	  not	  merely	  consider	  voters’	  demands	  and	  party	  ideology	   when	   proposing	   policies.	   Rather,	   the	   positions	   of	   their	   political	   party	   at	   the	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national	   level	   and	   the	   relationship	   of	   local	   governments	   to	   the	   center	   are	   also	   taken	   into	  consideration.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  established	  that	  local	  parties	  consider	  beyond	  voters’	  preferences	  and	  their	  own	  ideological	  positions	  when	  proposing	  policies.	  More	  specifically,	  local	  parties	  also	  consider	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  party	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  investigate	  how	  the	  pattern	  of	  policy	  proposals	  varies	  with	  the	  strength	  of	  linkage	  between	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments.	  	  	  
6. RESULTS	  OF	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  MANIFESTOS	  IN	  LIGHT	  OF	  CENTRAL-­‐LOCAL	  
RELATIONS	  	  In	   the	  previous	  section,	   I	  analyzed	  and	  compared	   the	  contents	  of	   local	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  party	  manifestos.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  provide	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  party	  manifesto	  content	  depends	  on	   the	   strength	   of	   central-­‐local	   relations.	   In	   view	   of	   the	   results	   of	   manifesto	   analysis	   as	  presented	   in	   the	  previous	  section,	   I	  now	  establish	   that:	  1)	   there	   is	  a	  relationship	  between	  prefectural	  assembly	  (PA)	  election	  results	  and	  Lower	  House	  (LH)	  election	  results,	  and	  that	  link	  is	  backwards;	  2)	  manifesto	  content	  is	  related	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  link	  between	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments.	  I	  use	  data	  from	  the	  2011	  prefectural	  assembly	  elections	  and	  Lower	  House	  elections	  in	  2009	  and	  2012,	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  manifesto	  analysis.	  	  
	  
6.1	  ANALYSIS	  AND	  METHODOLOGY	  
First,	  using	  results	  of	  the	  prefectural	  assembly	  elections	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  Lower	  House	  elections,	   I	   calculated	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   parties	   of	   prefectural	   assembly	   politicians	  matches	   the	   parties	   of	   the	   Lower	   House	   politicians	   in	   the	   same	   election	   districts.	   This	  analysis	  makes	  use	  of	  data	  from	  a	  working	  dataset	  (Kay	  Shimizu,	  Multi-­‐level	  Elections	  Data	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on	   Japan:	  1995	  –	  2012).	   ‘Matching’	  here	   refers	   to	   the	   case	  when,	   for	   instance,	  an	  election	  district	  that	  has	  a	  LDP	  Lower	  House	  politician	  also	  has	  a	  LDP	  prefectural	  assembly	  member.	  The	  degree	  of	  matching	  is	  defined	  as	  how	  many	  ‘matches’	  there	  are	  out	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	   winning	   candidates	   in	   the	   prefectural	   assembly	   election.	   Furthermore,	   in	   order	   to	  investigate	  whether	  the	  link	  between	  results	  of	  the	  prefectural	  assembly	  and	  results	  of	  the	  Lower	  House	  elections	   is	  backward-­‐oriented	  or	   forward-­‐oriented	   (ie.	  whether	  prefectural	  assembly	   elections	   are	   linked	   predominantly	   to	   the	   Lower	  House	   elections	   that	   occurred	  before	  or	   after	   it),	   the	  2011	  prefectural	   assembly	  election	   results	  were	   compared	   to	  both	  the	  2009	  and	  2012	  Lower	  House	  election	  results.	  	  The	   results	   of	   this	   comparison	  were	   then	   compared	   to	   the	   results	   of	   the	   analysis	   of	  manifesto	  content,	  where	  a	  policy	  group	  of	  particular	   interest	  –	  Controversial	  policies	  –	   is	  further	  investigated.	  The	  policy	  group	  ‘Controversial	  policies’	  referred	  to	  here	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  one	  found	  under	  Section	  5.2,	  Table	  5.4,	  and	  refers	  to	  policies	  of	  contentious	  nature	  that	  potentially	  challenge	  the	  central	  government’s	  stance	  on	  certain	  issues,	  or	   in	  some	  way	  or	  another	   threaten	   the	   status	   quo,	   such	   as	   those	   pertaining	   to	   administrative	   reform,	   the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  (TPP),	  calls	  for	  greater	  local	  autonomy	  etc.,	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  cause	  discomfort	  to	  the	  center	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  	  My	  hypotheses	  are	  two-­‐fold.	  Firstly,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  backward	  linkages	  rather	  than	  forward	  linkages	  matter.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  2009	  Lower	  House	  elections	   and	   the	   2011	   prefectural	   assembly	   elections	   is	   significant,	   rather	   than	   the	  relationship	  between	   the	  2012	  Lower	  House	  elections	  and	   the	  2011	  prefectural	  assembly	  elections.	  For	  one,	  as	  Lower	  House	  politicians	  are	  pipelines	  through	  which	  localities	  obtain	  resources	  for	  expenditure	  and	  local	  projects,	  I	  postulate	  that	  prefectural	  assembly	  members	  who	  are	   from	  the	  same	  party	  as	  an	  already-­‐elected	  Lower	  House	  politician	   in	  a	  particular	  election	  district	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  deemed	  by	  voters	  to	  be	  able	  to	  benefit	  more	  from	  the	  Lower	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House	   politician,	   and	   therefore	   stand	   higher	   chances	   of	   being	   elected	   to	   the	   prefectural	  assembly.	  Secondly,	  the	  actions	  of	  national-­‐level	  politicians	  and	  the	  central	  government	  are	  very	   visible	   and	   can	   have	   profound	   impacts	   on	   prefectures	   and	   localities,	   such	   that	   the	  inclination	   of	   voters	   to	   choose	   specific	   parties	   at	   prefectural	   assembly	   elections	   may	   be	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  what	  happens	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  Secondly,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  prefectures	  with	  low	  matching	  rates	  have	  relatively	  more	  policies	  that	  are	  considered	  ‘Controversial’.	  In	  line	  with	  my	  central	  argument,	  I	  believe	  that	  local	   governments	   that	   have	   closer	   ties	   to	   the	   center	   are	   more	   tightly	   constrained	   by	  central-­‐local	   relations,	   such	   that	   policies	   proposed	   by	   local	   governments	   in	   these	  prefectures	  are	  more	  unlikely	  to	  contradict	  or	  challenge	  the	  status	  quo	  or	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  central	  government.	  Conversely,	  prefectures	  with	  lower	  congruence	  face	  fewer	  central-­‐local	  relations	  constraints,	  such	  that	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  propose	  policies	  that	  respond	  to	  the	  demands	  of	   the	  people	  which	  may	  also	   challenge	   the	   authority	   and	   control	   of	   the	   central	  government.	  	  	  
6.2	  RESULTS	  OF	  ANALYSIS	  
Below,	  I	  present	  my	  results	  for	  the	  degree	  of	  matching	  of	  PA	  and	  LH	  election	  results.	  With	  this,	  I	  then	  establish	  the	  direction	  of	  linkages	  between	  the	  local	  and	  central	  governments.	  	  	  6.2.1	  CONGRUITY	  OF	  RESULTS	  	  Prefectures	  where	   the	  party	   of	   prefectural	   assemblymen	  matched	   the	  party	   of	   the	   Lower	  House	  member	   in	   over	   two-­‐thirds	   (60%)	   of	   the	   electoral	   districts	  within	   the	   prefectures	  were	  considered	  prefectures	  with	   ‘high	  congruence’,	  while	   those	  where	   the	  matching	  was	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less	  than	  one-­‐third	  (30%)	  were	  considered	  prefectures	  with	  ‘low	  congruence’.6	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  prefectures	  were	  considered	  ‘average’	  prefectures	  with	  matching	  rates	  of	  between	  30%	  and	  60%.	  The	  results	  of	  matching	  of	  PA	  election	  results	  and	  LH	  election	  results	  are	  shown	  below:	  	  	   Number	  of	  Prefectures	  
2009	   2012	  
Low	  Congruence	  	   11	  (48%)	   3	  (13%)	  
High	  Congruence	  	   3	  (13%)	   3	  (13%)	  
Table	  6.1:	  Number	  of	  low	  and	  high	  congruence	  prefectures	  	  The	  general	  pattern	  of	   congruity	   across	  prefectures	  and	  across	  years	   supports	   the	  notion	  that	   congruity	   is	   correlated	  with	   patterns	   of	   policy	   proposals	   in	  manifestos.	  We	   first	   put	  aside	   the	   direction	   of	   linkages	   and	   look	   at	   overall	   patterns.	  With	   the	   LDP	   controlling	   the	  Lower	   House	   in	   2012	   and	   being	   the	   dominant	   party	   in	   prefectural	   assemblies,	   a	   lower	  number	  of	   prefectures	   is	   expected	   to	  be	  of	   low	   congruity	   in	  2012	   than	   in	  2009.	  Also,	   the	  number	  of	  Controversial	  policies	  in	  these	  respective	  low-­‐congruity	  prefectures	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  lower	  if	  the	  matching	  rate	  is	  higher.	  Referring	  to	  Table	  6.1,	  we	  observe	  that	  number	  of	  prefectures	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  low	  congruence	   in	   2009	   (11	   prefectures)	   is	   higher	   than	   the	   number	   of	   low	   congruence	  prefectures	   in	  2012	  (3	  prefectures).	  Also,	   the	  average	  percentage	  of	  Controversial	  policies	  for	  these	  prefectures	  with	  low	  congruity	  is	  also	  higher	  at	  7.4%	  for	  2009	  than	  6.9%	  for	  2012.	  These	   match	   my	   expectations	   above	   and	   suggest	   that	   patterns	   of	   policy	   proposals	   are	  indeed	  correlated	  to	  degrees	  of	  congruity	  across	  prefectures	  and	  across	  years.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  30%	  and	  60%	  merely	  represent	  average	  percentages	  chosen	  as	  benchmarks.	  Choosing	  any	  figure	  between	  20%	  and	  40%,	  or	  50%	  and	  70%	  did	  not	  yield	  significantly	  different	  results	  from	  the	  chosen	  benchmarks	  of	  30%	  and	  60%	  respectively.	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6.2.2	  DIRECTION	  OF	  LINKAGES	  To	  determine	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  results	  of	  LH	  elections	  that	  are	  predominantly	  related	  to	  the	  subsequent	   PA	   elections	   or	   vice	   versa,	   I	   draw	   a	   link	   between	   the	   results	   of	   congruence	  matching	  as	  described	  above	  and	  the	  results	  of	  manifesto	  analysis	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  to	  illustrate	  the	  direction	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  central-­‐local	  relations.	  	  
	  
Backward	  Linkages	  In	  the	  case	  of	  backward	  linkages,	  I	  examine	  the	  link	  between	  the	  2011	  PA	  elections	  and	  the	  2009	  LH	  elections.	  In	  the	  PA	  elections	  in	  2011,	  the	  majority	  of	  politicians	  who	  ran	  for	  office	  and	  won	  were	   from	   the	  LDP	   (who	  compromised	  of	  47.7%	  of	   all	  winners,	   as	   compared	   to	  DPJ	  politicians	  who	  made	  up	  20.1%	  of	  all	  winners).	  In	  the	  2009	  LH	  elections,	  the	  DPJ	  won	  the	  majority	  of	  seats	  and	  became	  the	  ruling	  party	  in	  the	  Lower	  House.	  As	   observed	   from	   the	   comparison	   of	   prefectural	   assembly	   candidates	   with	   the	  candidates	  who	  won	   the	  Lower	  House	  elections,	   there	  were	  11	  prefectures	   that	  exhibited	  low	   congruity	   and	   3	   prefectures	   with	   high	   congruity	   (Table	   6.1).	   Examining	   the	   11	  prefectures	   with	   low	   congruity	   in	   further	   detail,	   I	   find	   that	   these	   prefectures	   made	   up	  35.71%	   of	   all	   prefectures	   with	   Controversial	   policies.	   Furthermore,	   these	   11	   prefectures	  constituted	   50.00%	   of	   prefectures	  where	   Controversial	   policies	   accounted	   for	  more	   than	  10%	  of	   their	   policy	   proposals.	   This	   points	   to	   a	   relatively	   high	   percentage	   of	   policies	   that	  were	  Controversial	  (as	  compared	  to	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  2011	  PA	  election	  data	  with	  the	  2012	  LH	  election	  data,	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  next	  section).	  The	  3	  prefectures	  with	  high	   congruity	   constituted	  11.11%	  of	   all	   prefectures	   that	   did	  not	  have	  any	  Controversial	  policies	  at	  all,	  and	  16.67%	  of	  prefectures	  that	  had	  less	  than	  10%	  of	  Controversial	  policies	   in	   their	  manifestos.	  Mirroring	   the	   results	  of	   the	  prefectures	  with	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low	  congruity,	  these	  percentages	  are	  relatively	  low	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  analysis	  with	  2011	  PA	  election	  results	  and	  2012	  LH	  election	  results.	  	  
	  
Forward	  Linkages	  For	   the	   case	  of	   forward	   linkages,	   the	   relevant	  datasets	   are	   the	  2011	  PA	  elections	  and	   the	  2012	  LH	  elections.	  The	  2011	  PA	  election	   is	   the	   same	  as	   the	  one	  mentioned	  above,	  where	  LDP	  constituted	  the	  majority	  of	  candidates	  and	  winners.	  For	  the	  2012	  LH	  elections,	  the	  LDP	  recaptured	  the	  LH	  in	  a	  landslide	  victory,	  rendering	  the	  DPJ	  a	  minority	  party.	  	  In	   this	   case,	   there	  were	  3	  prefectures	   that	  exhibited	   low	  congruity	  and	  3	  prefectures	  exhibited	   high	   congruity.	   The	   3	   prefectures	  with	   low	   congruity	   constituted	   14.29%	  of	   all	  prefectures	   with	   Controversial	   policies,	   and	   10.00%	   of	   prefectures	   with	   Controversial	  policies	  that	  constitute	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  their	  policy	  proposals.	  As	  compared	  to	  the	  results	  from	   the	   2009	   LH	   elections,	   this	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   these	   prefectures	   are	  particularly	   associated	   with	   Controversial	   policies,	   at	   least	   not	   any	   more	   so	   than	   the	  average	   prefecture.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   3	   prefectures	   with	   high	   congruity	   made	   up	  22.22%	  of	  all	  prefectures	  that	  did	  not	  have	  any	  Controversial	  policies	  at	  all,	  and	  25.00%	  of	  prefectures	   that	   had	   less	   than	   10%	   of	   Controversial	   policies	   in	   their	   manifestos.	   Again,	  these	   figures	   do	   not	   suggest	   that	   the	   prefectures	   with	   high	   congruity	   in	   2012	   have	  particularly	  low	  proportions	  of	  Controversial	  policies	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  case	  for	  2009.	  	  The	  results	  above	  are	  summarized	  in	  the	  figure	  below:	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Figure	  6.1:	  Backward	  and	  forward	  linkages	  between	  the	  2011	  PA	  elections	  and	  the	  2009	  and	  
2012	  Lower	  House	  elections	  	  Together,	  these	  suggest	  that	  the	  data	  for	  2009	  supports	  my	  hypotheses	  better	  than	  does	  the	  2012	  data.	  In	  other	  words,	  backwards	  linkages,	  rather	  than	  forward	  linkages,	  matter	  more.	  That	   congruity	   is	   correlated	   to	   the	   pattern	   of	   policy	   proposals	   also	   suggests	   that	   central-­‐local	  relations	  are	  correlated	  with	  parties’	  manifesto	  proposals.	  	  	  
6.3	  RECONCILING	  MY	  FINDINGS	  WITH	  WHAT	  HAPPENED	  
The	   above	   finding	   suggests	   that	   the	   link	   between	  prefectural	   assembly	   and	   Lower	  House	  elections	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  backwards.	  Yet	  what	  actually	  happened	  may	  seem	  to	  contradict	  my	  findings.	   Under	   my	   hypothesis	   of	   backwards	   linkage,	   for	   instance,	   the	   DPJ-­‐dominated	  central	  government	  in	  2009	  should	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  DPJ-­‐dominated	  prefectural	  assembly	  in	  2011.	  Yet	   it	  was	  the	  LDP	  that	  dominated	  the	  PA	  elections	   in	  2011.	  Moreover,	  results	  of	  the	   2012	   Lower	  House	   elections	   also	   seem	   to	   support	   the	   hypothesis	   of	   forward	   linkage	  
2011	  PA	  Elections	  2009	  LH	  Elections	   2012	  LH	  Elections	  Forward	  linkage	  Backwards	  linkage	  
• Prefectures	  with	  low	  congruity:	  11	  ⇒ 35.71%	  of	  all	  prefectures	  with	  Controversial	  policies	  ⇒ 50.00%	  of	  prefectures	  with	  >10%	  Controversial	  policies	  in	  their	  manifestos	  
• Prefectures	  with	  high	  congruity:	  3	  ⇒ 11.11%	  of	  all	  prefectures	  with	  no	  Controversial	  policies	  ⇒ 16.67%	  of	  prefectures	  with	  <10%	  Controversial	  policies	  in	  their	  manifestos	  
= 	  
• Prefectures	  with	  low	  congruity:	  3	  ⇒ 14.29%	  of	  all	  prefectures	  with	  Controversial	  policies	  ⇒ 10.00%	  of	  prefectures	  with	  >10%	  Controversial	  policies	  in	  their	  manifestos	  
• Prefectures	  with	  high	  congruity:	  3	  ⇒ 22.22%	  of	  all	  prefectures	  with	  no	  Controversial	  policies	  ⇒ 25.00%	  of	  prefectures	  with	  <10%	  Controversial	  policies	  in	  their	  manifestos	  
= 	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instead:	   an	   LDP-­‐dominated	   prefectural	   assembly	   in	   2011	   resulted	   in	   a	   LDP-­‐dominated	  central	  government	  in	  2012.	  	  However,	  I	  contend	  that	  backward	  and	  forward	  linkages	  cannot	  be	  derived	  by	  looking	  at	  just	  the	  election	  results.	  Actual	  events	  should	  also	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  The	  period	  from	  2009	  –	  2012	  was	  ‘special’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  a	  party	  other	  than	  the	  LDP	  or	  an	  LDP-­‐led	  coalition	  was	  dominant	  in	  the	  Lower	  House.	  Equally	  importantly	  was	  the	  2011	  Tōhoku	  Earthquake,	  which	  had	  a	  decisive	  effect	  on	  the	  election	  results.	  	  	  I	  will	  next	  relate	  my	  argument	  to	  actual	  happenings	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  show	  how	  this	  fits	  into	  my	  hypothesis.	  
	  
Explaining	  the	  2011	  PA	  Elections	  Results	  	  In	   the	   2009	   Lower	   House	   elections,	   the	   DPJ	  won	   a	  majority,	   resulting	   in	   a	   Lower	   House	  dominated	   by	   DPJ	   politicians.	   Lower	   House	   politicians	   serve	   as	   pipelines	   through	   which	  resources	  are	  channeled	   from	  the	  central	  government	   to	   local	  governments,	   and	   I	  believe	  that	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   Lower	  House	   politicians	   as	  well	   as	   the	  party	   performance	   in	  general	   are	   important	   factors	   influencing	   the	   choice	   of	   voters	   in	   the	   subsequent	   2011	  election.	   Given	   this,	   while	   we	   might	   expect	   voters	   to	   choose	   more	   DPJ	   politicians	   in	   the	  2011	  prefectural	  assembly	  elections	  as	   the	  Lower	  House	  was	  predominantly	  DPJ	   in	  2011,	  there	  was	  one	  other	   important	   factor	  that	  greatly	   influenced	  the	  choice	  of	  voters	   in	  2011:	  the	  2011	  Tōhoku	  disaster.	  	  The	   March	   11	   Tōhoku	   Earthquake	   which	   occurred	   just	   before	   the	   2011	   prefectural	  assembly	   elections	  were	  held	  had	   a	  decisive	   impact	   on	   the	   election	   results.	   In	   the	   face	  of	  extensive	   damage	   by	   the	   earthquake	   and	   tsunami	   which	   left	   450,000	   homeless,	   some	  15,000	  dead	  and	  over	  2500	  missing	  (National	  Police	  Agency	  of	   Japan,	  Emergency	  Disaster	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Countermeasures	  Headquarters	  2013),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  nuclear	  disaster	  with	  the	  meltdown	  of	  3	   reactors	   in	   Fukushima	  Daiichi	  Nuclear	   Power	   Plant,	   the	   inexperienced	  DPJ	   government	  was	  unable	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  multitude	  of	  problems	  that	  beset	  eastern	  Japan.	  	  Internal	  communication	  and	  coordination	  within	  the	  government	  were	  sorely	  lacking,	  as	  the	  government	  lacked	  a	  viable	  and	  functional	  crisis	  management	  team	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  emergencies	  adequately	  and	  in	  a	  timely	  fashion.	  The	  breakdown	  in	  communication	  between	  the	   DPJ-­‐led	   politicians	   and	   bureaucrats	   was	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   DPJ	   attempts	   to	   establish	  politician	   control	   over	   the	   bureaucracy,	   and	   ministries	   were	   unwilling	   to	   assume	  responsibility	   in	   implementing	  measures	   that	  were	  necessary	   to	  alleviate	   the	  situation	  on	  the	   ground,	   preferring	   to	   wait	   for	   politicians	   to	   lead	   the	   way.	   There	   was	   no	   viable	  contingency	  plan	  in	  case	  of	  emergencies	  –	  both	  in	  the	  government	  and	  in	  Fukushima	  Daiichi	  Nuclear	   Power	   Plant.	   Then-­‐Prime	   Minister	   Naoto	   Kan’s	   inexperience	   led	   him	   to	  micromanage	   rescue	   efforts,	   which	   caused	   confusion	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   delayed	   critical	  response	  measures.	  Collaboration	  with	  external	  organizations	  such	  as	  foreign	  rescue	  teams	  were	   also	   haphazard,	   wasting	   valuable	   time	   before	   these	   teams	   were	   employed	   to	   the	  disaster	   zones.	   Moreover,	   the	   withholding	   of	   information	   from	   the	   public	   as	   well	   as	   the	  conflicting	   signals	   which	   were	   meant	   to	   prevent	   widespread	   panic	   and	   reassure	   people,	  instead	  led	  to	  a	  rapid	  erosion	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  government	  (Funabashi	  2011).	  	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   paralysis	   of	   the	   DPJ	   government	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   Tohoku	  earthquake	  shook	  the	  people’s	  already-­‐weak	  trust	  in	  the	  politicians	  and	  the	  ministries.	  This	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  decisive	  factor	  in	  the	  2011	  prefectural	  assembly	  elections	  that	  took	  place	  just	  after	   the	   Tohoku	   disaster,	   where	   voters,	   disillusioned	   with	   the	   DPJ,	   opted	   for	   the	   LDP	  instead.	  	  
	   	  
56	  	  
Explaining	  the	  2012	  Lower	  House	  Election	  Results	  Conversely,	   if	   forward	   linkages	  were	   to	   characterize	   the	   relationship	  between	  prefectural	  assembly	  politicians	  and	  Lower	  House	  politicians,	  it	  would	  imply	  that	  one	  important	  factor	  influencing	   voters’	   choice	   of	   Lower	   House	   politicians	   would	   be	   the	   identity	   and	  performance	  of	  prefectural	  assembly	  members.	  Although	  we	  do	  observe	  here	  that	  the	  LDP	  dominated	   both	   the	   2011	   Prefectural	   Assembly	   elections	   and	   the	   2012	   Lower	   House	  elections,	   the	   landslide	   victory	   of	   the	   2012	   Lower	   House	   elections	   had	   more	   to	   do	   with	  voters’	   disillusionment	   with	   the	   previous	   DPJ	   government	   than	   approval	   of	   the	   LDP	  politicians’	  performance	  in	  local	  prefectural	  assemblies.	  As	  noted	  by	  scholars	  and	  echoed	  by	  the	  press,	   the	  LDP	  election	   in	  2012	  was	  not	  a	  mandate	   to	   rule,	  but	  a	   ‘rejection	  of	   the	   last	  three	  years	  of	  political	  confusion’	  (Nakamoto,	  Dickie	  and	  Soble	  2012).	  There	  could	  not	  have	  been	  a	  shift	  in	  voters’	  preferences	  towards	  the	  LDP	  stances	  in	  specific	  issues	  because	  there	  was	  little	  difference	  between	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  LDP	  and	  the	  DPJ,	  in	  terms	  of	  consumption	  tax,	   nuclear	   power,	   economic	   policy	   etc.	   (Schoppa	   2012).	   It	   is	   therefore	   inaccurate	   to	  conclude	  that	  the	  results	  of	  the	  2012	  Lower	  House	  elections	  were	  largely	  influenced	  by	  the	  2011	  prefectural	  assembly	  elections.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  this	  linkage	  is	  forward	  or	  backward,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  prefectures	  with	  low	  congruence	  have	  higher	  proportions	  of	  Controversial	  policies.	  As	  shown	   above,	   prefectures	   with	   low	   congruity	   had	   higher	   percentages	   of	   Controversial	  policies	  in	  2009	  than	  in	  2012.	  That	  these	  relations	  are	  weaker	  in	  the	  case	  of	  comparison	  of	  the	  2011	  prefectural	   assembly	  election	  with	   the	  2012	  Lower	  House	  election	   supports	   the	  hypothesis	  that	  backwards	  linkage	  is	  dominant.	  A	   comparison	   of	   the	   2009	   and	   2012	   data	   point	   to	   backward	   linkages	   as	   the	   more	  plausible	   relationship	   between	   prefectural	   assembly	   politicians	   and	   Lower	   House	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politicians.	  More	   importantly,	   the	  above	  analysis	  examined	  how	  the	  strength	  of	  backward	  linkages	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   content	   of	   manifestos	   –	   in	   other	   words,	   how	   the	   contents	   of	  manifestos	  are	  correlated	  the	  strength	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations.	  	  	  
7. CONCLUSION	  
I	  have	  showed	  that	  patterns	  of	  policy	  proposals	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  central-­‐local	   relations,	   where	   prefectures	   that	   exhibit	   stronger	   relations	   between	   the	   center	   and	  local	  governments	  have	  lower	  percentages	  of	  Controversial	  policy	  proposals.	  This	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  one	  factor	  inhibiting	  local	  parties	  from	  pushing	  for	  the	  change	  that	  the	  public	  demands	  is	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments.	  	  
PARALLEL	  TRENDS	  AND	  OBSERVATIONS	  
I	  argued	  in	  this	  paper	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  proposals	  for	  administrative	  reforms	  as	  observed	  in	  local	  parties’	  manifestos	  reflect	  constraints	  faced	  by	  local	  governments	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  central	  government.	  More	  broadly,	  the	  actions	  of	  local	  governments	  are	  influenced	  and	   shaped	   by	   institutional	   structures	   including	   central-­‐local	   relations	   and	   intra-­‐party	  relations	  between	  local-­‐	  and	  national-­‐level	  politicians.	  	  Observations	   of	   institutional	   structures	   affecting	   local	   politicians’	   behavior	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  center	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  patterns	  of	  policy	  proposals	  in	  manifestos.	  For	  instance,	  Lin	  (2009)	   shows	   that	  Koizumi	  was	   selected	   as	  party	   leader	  because	  of	   the	   changes	   to	  LDP’s	  internal	   electoral	   rules,	  which	   gave	   local	   chapters	   greater	   voting	   power	   than	   before.	   LDP	  Diet	  politicians	  expected	  that	  voting	  by	  local	  politicians	  would	  follow	  factional	  interests	  and	  that	  they	  could	  rely	  on	  the	  alignment	  and	  support	  by	  local	  politicians.	  However,	  the	  public’s	  immense	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  way	  politics	  was	  run	  in	  the	  LDP,	  the	  view	  of	  the	  LDP	  as	  a	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‘haven	   of	   backroom	   politics’,	   and	   an	   increase	   in	   non-­‐partisan	   voters	   who	   generally	   pay	  greater	   attention	   to	   policies	   and	   are	   less	   swayed	   by	   pork-­‐barrel	   politics	   (Scheiner	   2005)	  compelled	  local	  politicians	  to	  reconsider	  their	  strategies.	  Instead	  of	  unconditionally	  backing	  their	   factions,	   local	   politicians	   decided	   that	   the	   advantages	   of	   presenting	   themselves	   as	  being	   more	   responsive	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   voters,	   which	   might	   in	   turn	   help	   them	   to	  secure	  re-­‐election,	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  of	  aligning	  themselves	  with	  their	  factions.	  	  This	   illustrates	   how	   the	   relationship	   between	   national	   politicians	   and	   local	   chapters	  affects	  the	  behavior	  of	  local	  politicians.	  Here,	  a	  change	  in	  the	  institutional	  structure	  –	  in	  this	  case,	   the	   electoral	   rules	   within	   the	   LDP	   –	   coupled	  with	   the	   already-­‐existing	   pressure	   for	  change,	  led	  to	  a	  deviation	  in	  behavior	  of	  local	  politicians	  from	  the	  past.	  Similarly,	  a	  parallel	  can	   be	   drawn	   between	   the	   relationship	   between	   local	   politicians	   and	   national	   politicians	  within	  the	  same	  party,	  and	  local	  governments	  and	  the	  central	  government	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  support	   for	  Koizumi	   to	  be	  elected	  as	  party	  president	  was	  a	  one-­‐time	  affair,	  but	   long-­‐term	  considerations	  of	  fiscal	  needs	  and	  support	  by	  the	  central	  government	  discourages	  parties	  in	  local	  governments	  from	  going	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  central	  government	  too	  frequently	  and	   too	   drastically.	   While	   the	   change	   in	   electoral	   rules	   was	   the	   impetus	   for	   local	   LDP	  politicians	   to	   go	   against	   preferences	   of	   national	   LDP	   politicians	   in	   2001,	   the	   institutional	  structure	  in	  place	  prescribing	  the	  power	  of	  local	  governments	  discouraged	  local	  politicians	  from	  surfacing	  policies	  that	  could	  prove	  detrimental	  to	  their	  long-­‐term	  relationship	  with	  the	  central	  government.	  	  Similarly,	  parties	  in	  local	  governments	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  modify	  their	  behavior	  or	  act	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  due	  to	  the	  need	  for	  fiscal	  resources	  and	  administrative	  support	  from	  the	   central	   government	   or	   parties	   in	   power.	   Saito	   (2009)	   shows	   that	   how	   incumbent	  national	  politicians	  choose	  their	  party	  memberships	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  need	  for	  them	  to	   align	   themselves	   with	   the	   ruling	   coalition	   to	   obtain	   the	   fiscal	   resources	   for	   public	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infrastructure	   construction	   demanded	   by	   constituents.	   Although	   his	   paper	   studies	   the	  behavior	  of	  national	  politicians,	  this	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  local	  politicians	  as	  well.	  I	  have	  explored	  how	  the	  behavior	  of	  local	  politicians	  is	  similarly	  constrained	  by	  the	  need	   to	   align	   themselves	  with	   the	  preferences	   of	   the	   central	   government	   to	   secure	   funds	  and	   resources.	   This	   need	   for	   resources	   (fiscal	   and	   administrative	   support	   or	   otherwise)	  influences	  the	  actions	  of	  incumbent	  national	  politicians,	  as	  well	  as	  local	  parties.	  
	  
REMAINING	  QUESTIONS:	  	  





How	  Special	  is	  the	  LDP?	  This	  paper	  has	  drawn	  upon	  manifesto	  data	   from	  primarily	   the	  LDP	  and	  to	  a	   lesser	  extent,	  the	  DPJ.	  While	  ideally	  such	  a	  study	  would	  entail	  an	  analysis	  of	  all	  manifestos	  from	  all	  parties	  such	   as	   the	   smaller	   Kōmeitō	   and	   the	   Japanese	   Communist	   Party,	   a	   lack	   of	   data	   has	  constrained	  my	  study	  on	  these	  smaller	  parties.	  Further	  research	  of	  such	  information	  could	  conceivably	   lead	  me	  to	  two	  very	  different	  conclusions.	   If	   these	  manifestos	  suggest	  greater	  conservativeness	   (ie.	   fewer	   proposals	   for	   reform	   of	   the	   political	   system)	   amongst	   the	  opposition	  parties,	  it	  would	  suggest	  that	  there	  might	  be	  other	  factors	  at	  play	  that	  influence	  party	  policy	  preferences	  as	  seen	  in	  manifestos.	  One	  obvious	  possible	  explanation	  would	  be	  the	  manifestos	  do	  not	  truly	  reflect	  what	  parties	  believe	  and	  are	  published	  just	  to	  enhance	  a	  party’s	  popular	  image.	  Another	  reason	  why	  even	  local	  politicians	  from	  other	  parties	  do	  not	  push	   for	   political	   reform	   is	   because	   they	   too,	   stand	   to	   gain	   from	   strong	   relationships	  between	  the	   local	  and	  central	  government	   through	   links	  with	   their	  coalition	  partners.	  For	  instance,	   local	   Kōmeitō	   politicians	   could	   have	   been	   benefiting	   from	   their	   strong	   ties	  with	  national	  LDP	  politicians.	  This	  would	   compel	   local	  opposition	  politicians	   to	  preserve	   these	  old	  relations	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  benefiting	  from	  them.	  	  If,	   however,	   the	   manifestos	   from	   these	   smaller	   opposition	   parties	   reflect	   a	   larger	  departure	   from	   old	   policies	   than	   those	   from	   the	   LDP	   and	   the	   DPJ,	   it	   would	   suggest	   two	  possibilities.	   One	   supports	   my	   hypothesis	   that	   manifestos	   and	   actions	   of	   local	   party	  branches	  reflect	  not	  only	  party	  policy	  preferences	  but	  are	  also	  constrained	  by	  the	  central-­‐local	  relations.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  case	   if	  manifestos	   from	  these	  smaller	  opposition	  parties	  (which,	  in	  line	  with	  my	  analysis,	  would	  be	  less	  constrained	  than	  both	  the	  LDP	  and	  the	  DPJ)	  would	  reflect	  more	  of	  voter’s	  preferences	  than	  the	  manifestos	  of	  the	  LDP	  and	  DPJ.	  Because	  they	  are	  less	  constrained	  by	  central-­‐local	  relations	  (unlike	  the	  DPJ	  in	  2011)	  and	  have	  a	  less	  of	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  preserving	  the	  ties	  between	  the	  center	  and	  localities	  (unlike	  the	  LDP	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in	  2011),	  these	  parties	  have	  a	  freer	  hand	  to	  appeal	  to	  local	  voters	  or	  propose	  policies	  in	  line	  with	  party	  preferences.	  However,	  there	  remains	  the	  second	  possibility	  that	  manifestos	  all	  but	  reflect	  an	   ‘anti-­‐ruling	   party’	   mentality	   amongst	   opposition	   parties.	   Just	   as	   how	   the	   DPJ	   expanded	   from	  1998	  to	  2003	  by	  absorbing	  politicians	  from	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum	  by	  trumpeting	  its	  ‘anti-­‐LDP’	   identification	   (Tatsumi	   2013),	   these	   opposition	   parties	   could	   very	   well	   be	  resorting	  to	  the	  same	  tactic	  of	  attacking	  the	  party	  in	  power	  to	  draw	  upon	  the	  dissatisfaction	  and	  belief	   that	  voters	  have	   that	   the	  problem	  not	  only	   lies	  with	   the	  DPJ	  but	  with	   the	  party	  system	   as	   a	   whole	   (Jou	   2012).	   This	   explanation	   is	   always	   a	   possibility,	   as	   it	   is	   virtually	  impossible	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   different	   intentions	   behind	   policy	   proposals	   (anti-­‐ruling	  party,	  genuine	  party	  stances	  or	  consideration	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations).	  If	  there	  was	  a	   way	   to	   distinguish	   the	   rationale	   behind	   the	   decisions	   to	   include	   certain	   proposals	   in	  manifestos	   and	   to	   leave	   out	   others,	   it	  would	   then	   be	   possible	   to	   examine	   how	   important	  central-­‐local	  relations	  are	  as	  a	  factor	  for	  consideration	  by	  politicians.	  	  	  Although	  the	  DPJ	  has	  been	  increasing	  in	  power	  in	  recent	  years,	  its	  politicians	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  match	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  LDP	  rivals	  both	  at	  the	  national	  level	  and	  even	  more	  so	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  Even	  in	  elections	  when	  the	  DPJ	  does	  well	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  able	   to	   improve	   its	  performance	   significantly	   at	   the	   local	   level	   (Scheiner	  2005).	  The	  organization	  and	  availability	  of	  local	  DPJ	  party	  manifestos	  in	  contrast	  with	  that	  of	  the	  local	  LDP	   parties	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   this	   disparity	   in	   performance	   –	   at	   the	   local	   level,	   the	  DPJ	   is	  simply	  not	  as	  organized	  as	   the	  LDP.	  Although	  one	  may	  argue	   that	   local	  manifestos	  do	  not	  play	  an	  important	  part	  in	  local	  elections	  today,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  important	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  such	  details	  to	  inspire	  voters’	  confidence	  in	  the	  party.	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Ultimately,	  manifestos	  are	  but	  tools	  employed	  by	  politicians	  to	  communicate	  ideas	  and	  intentions	  to	  the	  electorate.	  Manifestos	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  campaign	  platforms,	  but	  the	   use	   of	   the	   foreign	   word	   ‘manifestos’	   suggests	   something	   new	   and	   profound	   (Curtis	  2004).	  The	  surge	  in	  interest	  in	  manifestos	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  change	  in	  Japan’s	  political	  system	  mirrors	  the	  demand	  for	  change	  to	  the	  prevailing	  system.	  While	  the	  use	  of	  policy	  proposals	  in	  manifestos	  as	  a	  harbinger	  for	  change	  is	  not	  accurate	  due	  to	  the	  numerous	  influences	  they	  reflect,	  but	  it	  can	  provide	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  intentions	  for	  change	  by	  local	  politicians.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  reason	  why	  such	  change	  may	  not	  be	  forthcoming	  is	  because	   local	  governments	  cannot	  respond	  freely	  to	  these	  demands	  due	  to	  considerations	  of	   their	   relations	  with	   the	   central	   government.	   Institutional	   relations,	   specifically	   central-­‐local	   relations,	   constraining	   the	   behavior	   and	   choices	   that	   local	   political	   parties	   have	  possibly	   constitute	   a	   significant	   factor	   as	   to	   why	   local	   governments	   are	   not	   actively	  implementing	   those	   changes.	   Therefore,	   I	   suggest	   that	   manifestos	   do	   not	   only	   reflect	  politicians’	   intentions,	   but	   also	   other	   constraints	   –	   primarily	   center-­‐local	   relations	   –	   that	  may	   obscure	   their	   true	   intentions	   to	   change.	   In	   particular,	   findings	   suggest	   that	   the	  interdependent	   relationship	   model	   is	   the	   dominant	   model	   here,	   as	   while	   the	   center	  obviously	  holds	   sway	  over	   local	   governments,	   local	   governments	   also	   enjoy	   some	   limited	  autonomy	  as	  can	  be	  observed	  by	  how	  patterns	  of	  policy	  proposal	  vary	  with	  the	  strength	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations.	  	  This	  paper	  is	   limited	  to	  examining	  the	  behavior	  and	  intent	  of	   local	  political	  parties	  as	  observed	  through	  manifestos,	  but	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  discussion	  of	  how	  institutional	  factors	  affect	   the	   choice	   and	   behavior	   of	   political	   actors.	   While	   motivations	   and	   intentions	   to	  change	  may	  be	  real,	  these	  may	  be	  masked	  by	  these	  institutional	  relations	  that	  restrict	  what	  local	   governments	   can	   achieve.	   Further	   investigation	   how	   these	   institutional	   factors	   and	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central–local	   relations	   permeate	   political	   decision-­‐making	   and	   dictate	   Japan’s	   pace	   of	  political	  change	  is	  left	  to	  future	  research.	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